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I.

INTRODUCTION

The enterprise of adjudication cedes enormous authority to
pre-existing norms. "To judge in general," one prominent legal
theorist tells us, "means to decide by reference to pre-existing
standards rather than personal whim. Courts ... [decide] cases by
reference to external legal standards .... Thus [a] court is doubly constrained: it must reach decisions that accord with pre-existing standards (it must judge), and it has no choice about the
standards to be used in performing that task (it must judge according to law)."' In this Article, I explore the extent to which
the idea of legal decision as the resolution of disputes by reference to pre-existing, distinctively legal norms can legitimate the
enterprise of adjudication. I conclude that this idea can neither
supply legal decision with all the legitimation necessary, nor provide persuasive reasons for favoring one of several plausible accounts of how the institution of legal decision ought to proceed.
Part II of the Article argues that the idea of settling disputes
by reference solely to pre-existing law has deep and broad appeal
within the tradition of liberal political thought. The principle of
legislative supremacy, the formal elements of the rule of law, and
general liberal beliefs about the nature of legitimate political authority in a free and pluralistic polity, all underwrite a conception
of legal decision as decision in accordance with general, pre-existing public norms. Part II then develops the implications of these
ideas by sketching the criteria that the enterprise of adjudication

1 PHILIP SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW 111 (1984). Cf Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rue, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1187 (1989) ("I urge that. .. the Rule of

Law, the law of rus, be extended as far as the nature of the question allows; and
that . . . we appellate judges bear in mind that when we have finally reached the point
where we can do no more than consult the totality of the circumstances, we are acting
more as fact-finders than as expositors of the law.").
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must meet if pre-existing law is to govern the resolution of concrete cases.
Parts III, IV, and V argue that there are two prescriptive accounts of legal decision that hold the most promise of showing
how adjudication might be nothing more than the enterprise of
deciding cases in accordance with the dictates of pre-existing public norms. One account pictures law as a system of discrete rules,
and legal reasoning as rule application. The other account views
law as a seamless web of moral principle, and legal reasoning as
an enterprise akin to the search for reflective equilibrium in moral
reasoning. Both accounts fail to show how legal justification might
only rely on the authority of pre-existing public, norms. The picture of law as rule founders on the fact that legal rules are
plagued by conflicts and beset with gaps; the picture of law as a
web of moral principle is undone by the fact that legal materials
can be fashioned into several, equally well-woven seamless webs.
Under either account, then, the enterprise of adjudication will
have to appeal to the authority of something other than pre-existing legal materials.
Finally, Parts VI and VII argue that legal decision cannot escape difficult issues of political legitimacy. Courts exercise political
power and their authority must be either legitimated or suspected.
The idea of decision in accordance with pre-existing law cannot
supply a complete legitimation. The theory of legal decision must
therefore bear the burden of showing how the exercise of judicial
power consistent with, but not determined by, pre-existing law can
be reconciled with the sovereignty of free and equal democratic
citizens.
II.

THE AuTHORrry OF PRE-EXISTING LAW
A.

PhilosophicalJustifications

Three basic premises of liberal political thought strongly support the view that courts ought to decide cases in accordance with
the dictates of general, public pre-existing norms: the institutional
principle of legislative supremacy; the ideal of the rule of law; and
the conviction that political discourse in general, and legal discourse in particular, must be sheltered from the full force of moral conflict and disagreement. The principle of legislative supremacy supports a regime of decision in accordance with pre-existing
standards in a blunt and forceful way. Legislatures are law-making
bodies; courts are law-applying bodies. Legislatures derive their
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legitimacy from the consent of the governed; courts derive theirs
from the faithfulness and fairness with which they bring the imperfectly expressed will of the people to bear on the resolution of
particular disputes.' On its face, then, the principle of legislative
supremacy supports judicial deference and a zealous unoriginaity,
as far as statutory construction is concerned.
The liberal idea of the rule of law provides additional support
for common law adherence to pre-existing law. The aspiration to a
government "not of persons but of laws" is central to liberal political theory.' Individual liberty is the central value of liberal political thought and the rule of law is an institutional precondition for
the flourishing of both personal and political freedom. The norms
of the legal system establish authoritatively enforced rights and
duties, set the terms of social cooperation, and engender legitimate expectations among citizens. "They constitute grounds upon
which persons can rely on one another and rightly object when
their expectations are not fulfilled. If the bases of these claims are
unsure, so are the boundaries of men's liberties.
As far as legal decision is concerned, the minimum implication of the ideal of the rule of law is that courts should decide
cases in accordance with general, public pre-existing laws-and
that they should do so impartially and fairly-"without zeal or
bias." Doing so will secure the minimum, but non-trivial, benefits
of the rule of law: the freedom and security that come from being
able to plan one's life in accordance with the obligations, prohibitions, and permissions of a public system of norms; the important
although incomplete fairness achieved when like cases are treated

2 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 is the pre-eminent expression of this proposition within
American political thought with its contrast between "will" and "judgment," with the legislature exercising "will" and the judiciary having "neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely

judgment." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 229-30 (Alexander Hamilton) (Encyclopedia Britannica ed., 1952). Furthermore, "[t]he courts must declare the sense of the law; and if
they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence
would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body." Id. at
231-32. THE FEDERALIsT No. 78, therefore, contemplates that both statutory construction
and constitutional interpretation will be unoriginal in this way.
3 "But where, says some, is the King of America? I'll tell you, friend, he reigns
above, and does not make havoc of mankind like the royal brute of Britain ....
[I]n
America THE LAW IS'KING. For as in absolute governments, the King is law, so in free
countries the law OUGHT to be King; and there ought to be no other.".Thomas Paine,
Common Sens in COMMON SENSE AND OTHER POLrnCAL WRrT Gs 3, 32 (Nelson F. Adkins
ed., 1953), quoted in Scalia, supra note 1, at 1176.
4 JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235 (1971). Rawls prefaces this passage by observing that "the rule of law is obviously closely related to liberty."
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similarly; and the buffer against the arbitrary exercise of state
power that adherence to public rules, impartially applied, secures.'
The third pertinent premise mandates that legitimate political
authority be at least partially distinct from general moral discourse. Liberalism supposes that modem societies are marked by
deep and pervasive disagreements over fundamental moral questions. Liberal political theory therefore insists that politics must be
grounded on principles which avoid or transcend those deep and
enduring disagreements.' "In a world in which opinions differ
about morality and the status of moral norms, it is of utmost importance to have normative guidance that cannot be collapsed to

5 The achievement of formal justice is a part of substantive justice because just laws
are rendered less just when their application is arbitrary or unfair, and unjust laws are
often rendered more unjust when they are arbitrarily applied. "[T]here is even greater
injustice if those already disadvantaged are also arbitrarily treated in particular cases when
the rules would give them some security." Id. at 59.
The achievement of decision in accordance with pre-existing norms is only a part of
a decent legal system because this achievement is fully compatible with norms whose
content is deeply unjust. Slave and caste systems can achieve formal equality of treatment.
The achievement of formal equality comes at a certain cost. See, e.g., Morton J.
Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE L.J. 561, 566 (1977) ("1
do not see how a Man of the Left can describe the rule of law as 'an unqualified human good'l It undoubtedly restrains power, but it also prevents power's benevolent exercise. It creates formal equality-not a considerable virtue-but it Pomotes substantive inequality by creating a consciousness that radically separates law from politics, means from
ends, processes from outcomes. By promoting procedural justice it enables the shrewd,
the calculating, and the wealthy to manipulate its forms to their own advantage.") (reviewing EDWARD P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS (1975)).
6 One strand of the liberal tradition, beginning with Hobbes, considers moral belief
to be the domain of purely subjective value choices, options over which persons and
groups disagree, and about which rational argument is impossible. This stark picture
makes the very maintenance of civil order depend on the separation of law from morality and on the sheltering of legal discourse from moral discourse. See THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN (Penguin Books 1974) (1651). For an imaginative reconstruction of Hobbesian
liberalism, see ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLTICS (1975). In more muted
form, the themes of this tradition frequently appear in the jurisprudence of legal positivism, in utilitarian moral, legal, and political theory, and in normative economics.
A second, less pessimistic strand of liberal political theory rejects the belief that
moral value is essentially subjective. This strand subscribes to the belief that "there are
many conflicting and incommensurable conceptions of [human] good, each compatible
with the full autonomy and rationality of human persons" and that "it is a natural condition for a free democratic culture that a plurality of conceptions of the good is pursued
by its citizens." John Rawls, Social Unity and Piimary Goods, in UTIUTARANISM AND BEYOND
159, 160 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982). This strand follows the tradition
of Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and now Rawls. For a clear statement of the significance of
reasonable pluralism in Rawls' theory, see John Rawls, The Domain of the Political and
Ome/apping Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L REV. 233, 234-35 (1989) [hereinafter Rawls, Domain of
the Political]. See also JOHN RAWLS, PoLTIcAL LIBERALISM xvii, xxiv, 24 n.27, 36-40, 216-20
(1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLMTICAL LIBERAUSMI.
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those controversial beliefs ....
We have a reason for keeping the
law from collapsing totally into politics or morality."7 In fact, we
have the strongest of reasons. The deepest wish of liberal democratic politics is to do away with founding political authority on
brute force, noble lies, or divine right and, instead, to ground it
in the rational consent of free and equal persons. This consent requires commonly held and publicly affirmed principles and values.
Liberalism therefore demands that legal justification be at
least partially autonomous from purely moral or political justification.' By so doing, it underscores the attractiveness of building
the institution of adjudication around the authority of pre-existing
public norms. In our (liberal) legal culture the authority of preexisting norms supplies the only uncontroversial justification
readily available for any legal decision. All other grounds are controversial. Courts institutionally are ill-suited to express popular will
or common consensus;9 appeals to divine or natural right seem
on their face incompatible with the character of democratic political authority;"° direct appeals to what is good or just risk foundering on the moral conflict that liberal political philosophy recognizes to be central to modem societies; and appeals to technical

7 Ruth Gavison, Legal Th7my and the Rol of Rules, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 727,
754-55 (1991).
8 Liberal political theory's conception of institutional roles contributes to its view of
the difference between permissible forms of legal justification and permissible forms of
political justification. Liberalism accords greater freedom to legislatures than to courts.
Legislatures and their members are free to throw out old laws and to enact new ones
without deference to some pre-existing norm. Legislators thus have more latitude to act
and greater access to a more varied set of grounds on which they may act than do
courts. For a good discussion of these differences, see Rawls, Domain of the Political supra
note 6, at 254-55. See generally RAwLs, POLUTICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 6.
An adequate account of legal decision will show how legal justification honors these
contrasts between legislation and adjudication. (Note that these contrasts are plainly incomplete. For example, addressing the legitimacy of administrative decision-making requires exploring further arguments and issues).
9 For the classic modern statement of this point (albeit in a constitutional context),
see JOHN H. ELY, DEMocRACY AND DISMTUST (1980). For an effort to specify how such an
appeal could be legitimate, see MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW
14-19 (1988).

10 Democratic sovereignty resides in the people, and so democratic moral authority
resides in the public culture. Democratic political philosophy thus emanates from, and returns to, moral and political ideals embedded in the culture that it addresses. See, eg.,
MICHAEL WALzER, THE COMPANY OF CRITICS (1988); John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping
Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STuD. 1 (1987); John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not
Metaphysicl, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. (1985); RAwLs, POLrncAL LIBERALISM, supra note 6, at
43-46, 133-72,
(1981).

212-54; Michael

Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, 9 POL. THEORY 379
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expertise or knowledge, pure and simple, appear to lack the requisite moral authority."
These are not necessarily insuperable problems. One can, for
instance, cloak even appeals to natural law in the authority of our
practices and so argue that democratic sovereignty presupposes,
rather than denies, the authority of natural law. 2 But these are
arduous endeavors in whose pursuit success is elusive. Therefore, it
is tempting to ground the authority of legal decision solely on the
invocation of pre-existing standards.
B.

Institutional Constraints

Taking seriously the idea of decision in accordance with preexisting norms thus imposes three general conditions on the practice of legal decision. First, the practice must meet the formal
conditions of generality, publicity, prospectivity, and impartiality
imposed by a thin notion of the rule of law.' Second, the prac-

11 Appeals to this kind of authority appear to be one of the legacies of legal realism. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY chs. 2, 3 (1973).
Technical expertise is one of the most salient considerations affecting the legitimacy
of administrative agencies-and one of the reasons why they require separate consideration. Id.
12 Michael Moore employs a strategy of this sort when he writes "that our interpretive practices reveal us to be ... natural lawyers." Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Th7oyy of Inkreation, 58 S. CAL. L REV. 279, 397 (1985).
13. See supra notes 4, 5 and accompanying text. I understand this "thin" notion of
the rule of law to be "the conception of formal justice, the regular and impartial administration of public rules . . . applied to the legal system." RAWts, supra note 4, at 235. Its
formal conditions "are those that would be followed by any system of rules which perfectly embodied the idea of a legal system." Id. at 2386. The precepts of the rule of law
("treat like cases alike," "no penalty without a law," "ought implies," and the requirements of procedural due process) express these formal conditions.
A similarly "thin" notion is found in H.LA. HART, Pindples of Legality and Justice in
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 202 (1961). Joseph Raz's account of the rule of law and its virtue
is also relatively thin, though some of its principles are intended to apply to law-making
and criminal enforcement in particular. See JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in
THE AUTHORrrY OF LAw: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALrrY 210 (1979).
This "thin" conception is part of virtually all "thicker" conceptions of the rule of
law, such as those of Hayek, Fuller and Dworkin. See RONA.D DWORKIN, Political Judges
and the Rule of Law, in A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 9 (1985); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALtxy
OF LAw ch. 2 (2d ed. 1969); FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM ch. 6
(1946). 'Thicker" conceptions of the rule of law either add more elements to the ideal,
as Dworkin does, or extract far greater normative content from seemingly formal notions,
as Fuller and Hayek do.
I assume a modem conception of the rule of law, not an ancient one. The meaning given to the rule of law by ancient political theorists, such as Aristotle, is very different. See Judith Shklar, Political Theoy and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR
IDEOLOGY? (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987).
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ice of legal justification must express the contrast between the
rule of general norms and the rule of persons (the rule of law
and the rule of "men") by being recognizably different from the
activity of justifying a particular political program or a particular
moral conception. This condition expresses both liberalism's -conviction that deep moral disagreement is a fundamental characteristic of modem political life and its belief that the institutional
roles of courts and legislatures differ markedly. Third, legal justification must be capable of yielding legal decisions-decisions distinctly rooted in pre-existing legal norms.
The meaning of, and justification for, this third condition may
be unclear. The basic idea is this: legal rationality may not require
uniquely and demonstrably correct answers, but it must be able to
perform the institutional task assigned to it-the task of ordering
conflicting claims on the basis of legal reasons. The rule of law
depends on the differentiation of law from non-law. Legal justification must honor this contrast by assigning legal reasons a decisive
role in the ordering of legal claims.
This requirement follows directly from the idea of a perfected
enterprise of decision in accordance with pre-existing law. For
such an enterprise to succeed, the prescriptive force of legal
norms cannot be exhausted before legal decisions are reached,
and the system of legal norms must be complete and coherent,
that is, free of insoluble internal conflicts. 4 Incomplete legal sys-

14 It is widely recognized that completeness and coherence are necessary to a mature legal system. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE 67-68 (1981) (discussing the
axiom of completeness "which is part of most conceptions of a mature legal system");
JULIUS STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYER'S REASONING 185-92, 212-18 (1964); MAx WEBER,
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 657-58 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978). Joseph Beale
notes it as a necessary characteristic of law. See JOSEPH HENRY BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF
LAws § 4.12 (1935) ("It is unthinkable in a civilized country that any act should fall
outside the domain of law. If law is regarded as command, then every act done must
either be permitted or forbidden."). See also John Leubsdorf, Deconstructing the Constitution,
40 STAN. L REV. 181, 182 (1987) ("We usually read legal writings in the light of their
use to decide controversies, and therefore demand at a minimum that they be complete
and consistent. Every act must be either lawful or unlawful; none can be both.").
Arthur Jacobson presents the pursuit of gapIessness as a dynamic property within an
inevitably open system-that is, as a Sisyphean striving for legal actors: 'The persons of
the correlation-altering jurisprudences [i.e., common law ones] attempt as one of the
ordinary burdens of legality to fill the universe with as much law as possible . . . . Persons cannot fulfill the ordinary burdens of legality without creating fresh legal materials.
The universe in such jurisprudences is not full . . . only fillable." Arthur J. Jacobson,
Hegel's Legal Plenum, 10 CARDozO L. REv. 877, 880-81 (1989). Frederick Schauer recognizes it as a property of common law legal systems. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE
RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULES BASED DECISION MAKING IN LAW AND IN
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tems cannot perfect legal decision in accordance with pre-existing
norms because they will be silent on disputes that may arise in the
course of their operation. Viewed from the vantage point of adjudication, the role of legal norms is to determine claims of entitlement. Consequently, just as the rules of tennis must make all
serves either in or out, 5 so too the "rules" of law must make all
claims of legal entitlement either valid or invalid. The dispositive
nature of legal rules requires our third criterion. Legal systems
presuppose that they contain within themselves the resources required to resolve the questions that arise in the course of their
operation. Recourse to reasons that lie beyond the boundaries of
the legal system represents a failure to 1 perfect
legal decision in
6
accordance with pre-existing legal norms.

See also ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS 95 (1990) ("If
[a system of norms] is complete, then for every conceivable fully described occasion governed by norms, the system classifies each alternative as required, optional, or forbidden."). As suggested later in this Article, the necessary completeness of the legal system
is central to Dworkin's critique of positivism. For a particularly clear statement of its
relevance, see DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 120-25.
The principle also makes its way into primary legal materials. For example, Hart
and Sacks take a passage from RADBRUCH, INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL STUDY 158-61 (9th
rev. ed. 1952), which quotes a provision of the French Civil Code (1804): "A judge who
refuses to enter judgment on the pretext of the silence, obscurity or inadequacy of the
statute is subject to prosecution for a denial of justice." Radbruch remarks that the terms
of this provision "[w]hether express or implied . . . are in force everywhere." H. M.
LIFE 373-75 (1991).

HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROcESS 1408-09 (1958).

The idea of completeness overlaps with the idea of comprehensiveness, which is also
often taken to be a characteristic feature of legal systems and is discussed in some of the
cases cited in this Article. For our purposes, completeness is the more important idea
and the fine points of its relationship with comprehensiveness can be ignored.
15 The tennis example is Dworkin's. See DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 124.
16 The arguments of the next three sections reconstruct and criticize conceptions of
legal rationality associated with three jurisprudential traditions: legal idealism, legal positivism, and critical legal studies. By so doing, I am attempting to construct the best case
for the thesis that legal decision is the application of pre-existing standards to present
cases. My interpretations and criticisms of these traditions are driven by my attempt to
determine if and how (or if not, how not and why not) legal decision might be reduced
to the enterprise of resolving present disputes by pre-existing norms. My interpretations
of these positions, therefore, are likely to appear unbalanced and unsympathetic to their
adherents. It might help the reader to place quotation marks around my use of terms
like "formalism" and "positivism" and names like "Hart" and "Dworkin."
Strictly speaking, then, it is correct to object to my readings of these positions as
incomplete at best and inaccurate at worst, but it is also beside the point Selective interpretation of these traditions is necessary to determine the extent to which the ideal of
decision in accordance with pre-existing norms can legitimate the institution of legal
decision. Furthermore, more relaxed and accurate renderings of positivism, idealism, and
critical legal studies only deepen the problems described here. Insofar as positivism and
idealism rely less on the authority of pre-existing norms and more on other grounds of
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POSITIVISM AND FORMALISM

Prescriptive accounts of legal justification come in two basic
types. One type conceives of law as rule, and of legal reasoning as
rule application. The other conceives of law as a web of basic
moral principles and legal reasoning as a kind of dialectical tacking between particular rules and general principles-between specific parts and the whole that they comprise. Each account has
been expressed in a wide variety of ways," and each, as we shall
see, can be reconstructed as an account of legal decision in accordance with pre-existing norms.
In one form or another, legal idealism seems to dominate
prescriptive American thought about legal decision. Indeed, Bruce
Ackerman presents the central precepts of idealism as relatively
uncontroversial aspects of sophisticated legal practice.

legitimacy to vindicate their accounts of legal decision, the legitimation problems that
afflict their accounts of legal decision are even more acute than I suggest. This is so
because the authority of pre-existing norms is the only uncontroversial ground to which
legal decision can appeal. I am grateful to Scott Altman for putting this objection to me
forcefully.
17 For important accounts of law and legal reasoning as "rule," in addition to those
of Hart and his followers, see EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING
(1949) and SCHAUER, supra note 14. For a less jurisprudential though highly instructive
account, see WILLIAM TWINING & DAVID MIERS, How TO DO THINGS WITH RULES (2d ed.
1982).
The belief that law is morally saturated, and legal justification holistic and
coherentist, finds its most distinctive jurisprudential expression in the work of Lon Fuller,
Henry Hart, Albert Sacks, and Ronald Dworkin. (Following Lewis D. Sargentich of Harvard, I shall call this position "legal idealism" to distinguish it from positivism on one
side, and natural law on the other. The term is also used by Raymond Bellotti to describe Dworkin's theory. See RAYMOND A. BELLOTTI, JUSTIMING LAW ch. 4 (1992)).
Some form of legal idealism is the dominant position in American academic legal
thought of a liberal cast. Bruce Ackerman, John Hart Ely, Owen Fiss, and Richard Fallon,
to name only a few, all endorse conceptions of constitutional interpretation which emphasize its moral core and are holistic and coherentist. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISMTUST (1980); Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Pdliuics/Comstitutional Law, 99 YALE
L.J. 453, 515-19, 525-26, 540.45 (1989); Richard H. Fallon, A Comructivist Coherence T oy
of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987); Owen M. Fiss, Objetivity and
InprWation, 34 STAN L REV. 739 (1982).
Similar emphases on holistic interpretation and the dependence of legal norms on
moral norms are also found in influential contemporary theories of statutory construction,
including those of Calabresi and Sunstein. See Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Inkrpretation,

97 YALE LJ. 1685, 1693 (1988).
With its emphasis on both formal coherence of general principles and overt moral
evaluations, the "grand style" of American adjudication praised by Karl Llewellyn also
seems to be an exemplary instance of idealism. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON

LAW

TRADITION

36 (1960).
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No good tax lawyer... would ever think of reading the Internal Revenue Code one clause at a time ....
While, of course,
the text of each clause is always important, a good lawyer cannot fix its meaning without construing it in the light of principles that make sense of the larger Code of which it is a part.
In attempting this familiar kind of holistic interpretation, the
reader tries to understand the text as something more than an
odd assortment of particularized commands. She tries to organize the rules in terms of principles that give the rules an
intelligible order, working from particular clauses to more
general principles until she reaches reflective equilibrium. 8
As renderings of the ideal of decision in accordance with pre-existing law, however, accounts of law as rule seem to have a certain
priority.
The precepts of the rule of law push powerfully towvards both
positivism and formalism. Maxims of possibility ("ought implies
can"), publicity ("no offence without a law"), and prospectivity ("no
penalty without a law") press the law towards positivism. Laws must
be clear and publicly comprehensible, distinct from conventional
morality, custom, consensus, or political morality by some criterion
or set of criteria. The more clear, specific, and publicly knowable
the law is, the more the rule of law (the rule of impersonal
norms) is achieved. The less clear, specific, and knowable the law
is, the less secure liberty is,"9 and the more dependent citizens
are on the benevolence and wisdom of those charged with enforcing and interpreting the law. Abstractness and vagueness make the
rule of law less distinct from the rule of persons.
Hence the allure of positivism. The rule of law suggests that
the law should be a matter of rules as norms-as general directives capable of guiding conduct. 2' This sense of rule is essential
both to the rule of law as rule by impersonal agency (and so to
the contrast between constitutionalism and despotism), and to the
rule of law as a disciplining of political power by general guidelines and boundaries (and so to the contrast between
constitutionalism and totalitarianism). Second, the ideal of the

18 Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bow*'s Grand Inquisition, 99 YALE Lj. 1419, 1425-26 (1990)
(reviewing ROBERT H. BORIC, THE TEMFING OF AMERICA (1990)).
19 See RAwLs, supra note 4, at 235-40.
20 This is the idea of law as "social rule" that Hart made famous. See genera!ly H.LA.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1990). For our purposes, the critical property of norms
understood in this way is their autonomy: the norms themselves guide; they aie not
merely markers of and for deeper moral reasons.
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rule of law directs the law towards rules understood as specific,
distinctively legal prohibitions ("no vehicles in the park") in contrast to abstract moral principles ("no man may profit from his
own wrong"). 1 Abstract moral principles are less determinate
than specific rules and less autonomous from political morality,
custom, and convention. If the rule of general norms is to be
sharply distinguished from the rule of particular persons, then legal norms must be both clear and clearly distinguished from other
normative material. Positivism is the conception of law which appears fully to satisfy these requirements of autonomy and intelligibility.2

21 The former is the rule that H.LA. Hart uses to illustrate the characteristics of legal reasoning. See H.LA. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L
REV. 593 (1958). Ronald Dworkin takes its specificity to be essential to its "ruleness" in
his influential critique of Hart. See HART, supra note 20, at ch. 7; RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY ch. 2 (1977). The latter is an abbreviated version of the principle
that Dworkin cites as a typical legal principle. See DWORKIN, supra, at 23.
22 The view that the rule of law requires positivism in legal theory and formalism in
legal reasoning is undergoing something of a renaissance, in both theory and practice.
Practically, the renaissance is led by Justice Scalia. See, eg., Scalia, supra note 1. Scalia's
opinions can be even more stark. "A government of laws means a government of rules.
Today's decision is ungoverned by rule, and hence ungoverned by law." Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Theoretically, the renaissance is led by Frederick Schauer. See Frederick Schauer,
Rules and The Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 645, 666-67 (1991) ("Positivism . .. is not only a descriptive claim, purporting to give an account of those legal
systems in which a limited and pedigrecable set of norms is extensionally divergent from
the non-pedigreed set of norms then accepted within a society ....
[T]he distinction
between law and non-law is a central feature of the positivist picture. Under the 'limited
domain' account, there is plainly a close affinity between legal positivism and rule-based
decision-making. This affinity stems from the fact that both the idea of a rule and the
idea of positivism as a limited set of norms entail some extensional divergence between
the set of results indicated by a rule or set of rules and the set of results indicated by
the full array of norms otherwise accepted by some decisionmaker.") (footnotes omitted).
See generally SCHAUER, supra note 14.
Schauer's conception of positivism, like my own, is a prescriptive one. Prescriptive
positivism holds that law ought to consist of a limited set of pedigreed rules so that legal
decisions can be made without the exercise of moral judgment. Hobbes, Hume and
Bentham are pre-eminent proponents of prescriptive positivism. See genenally GERALD
POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADrTION 328-36 (1986). Descriptive positivism holds that all law can be understood as a system of norms whose ultimate authority
derives from some positive convention. H.LA Hart is frequently regarded as a descriptive
positivist. See generaly JULES L COLEMAN, Negative and Positive Positivism in MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 3 (1988); Gavison, supra note 7; Jeremy Waldron, The Irrdevance of
Moral Ojectivity, in NATURAL LAW THEORY. CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 158, 159-62 (Robert P.
George ed., 1992).
The belief that formalism is the theory of adjudication required by the rule of law
is not confined to supporters of positivism. It has also seemed irresistible to many who
would like to resist it. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation,
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Legal positivism pictures law as both the quintessential human
artifact (as something willed or posited) and the quintessential
social fact (as a fact determined by the prior acts of legislators).
As the quintessential human artifact, law is no more related to
morality than is any other human tool. As the quintessential social
fact, law is not dependent for its application, on an infusion, of
moral value.s The question of what the law is at any particular
moment in time and with respect to any particular dispute is a
thoroughly empirical question about what laws have been willed
into existence. To answer the question, one looks not to moral
ideals or to truths discerned through the rational apprehension of
an independent order of natural or divine values, but to "institutional facts" 4-- facts about what legislatures and courts have done
and said. Valid laws, in brief, are identified by determining what
legislative bodies have enacted and what adjudicative institutions
have ruled.
Prescriptive positivism thus demoralizes law.' Law is a system

58 S. CAl. L REV. 277 (1985); Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L.
REv. 151 (1981); Margaret J. Radin, Reconside7ing the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REv. 781,
791, 792-97, 810-12 (1989).
23 The fundamental challenge for positivism is to explain the "fact" that law is regarded as normative by those subject to its sway without conceding any necessary link between law and morality. Forms of positivism vary in the way that they account for legal
normativity. The sketch of positivism given here is derived from H.LA. Hart. For Hart,
law's normativity derives from the fact that the legal system's fundamental norm (its "rule
of recognition") is accepted by the citizenry the legal order governs. See HART, supra note
20. My interpretation of Hart is unbalanced because I am constructing a prescriptive conception of" positivism. For a more balanced perspective, see NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A.
HART (1981). For a discussion of the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive
forms of positivism, see supra note 22.
24 See Neil MacCormick, Law as InstitutionalFad, 90 LQ. REV. 102 (1974).
25 Although both prescriptive and descriptive positivism are, strictly speaking, agnostic
on the character of the moral order, prescriptive positivism in particular is frequently
linked with the thesis that all values are equal because the choice of any value must be
arbitrary, subjective and without rational foundation. Here the source is Hobbes. A notorious recent example of the linkage is Robert Bork. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral PFindples
and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. UJ. 1, 10 (1971). Cf ROBERT H. BORM, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA ch. 7 (1990). Value subjectivism reinforces positivism in two related ways. First, if the moral order is a realm of unarbitrable chaos, the need for positivism-the need to separate legality and morality-is all the more acute. Second, if moral
choice is essentially arbitrary, we not only need to separate law fron morality, we also
need to purge law of morality. We not only need positivism, we need a truly pure sort of
positivism. Law must be a matter of specific rules, not a matter of abstract principles
because the concrete implications of abstract principles must be worked out before such
principles can resolve actual disputes. And to the extent that abstract legal norms must
b cemented by further specifications of the values that they embrace, abstract norms
require moral choices and thereby threaten to thrust such legal reasoning back into the
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of conventional rules, highly specific in character and clearly separate from background morality, custom, and consensus by criteria
of recognition, criteria which pertain principally to pedigree or
origin.26 Moreover, the legal order as a whole is grounded not on
congruence with natural or divine law or any other form of moral
authority, but on the social fact of acceptance. Moral grounds
enter into law only at those discrete points where they are willed
in-when the legislature incorporates a moral conception into a
positive legal order by enacting the concept of "good faith," for
instance, or when the Constitution bans "cruel and unusual" punishment. 7
Legal positivism also demoralizes legal reasoning. It promotes
a conception of law as a system of distinctively legal rules, unified
by pedigree or genealogy, and applied to the resolution of disputes by acts of subsumption. In applying those rules, recourse is
required only to posited sources of value-to the values enshrined
by those legislative acts of will which create law, and, in difficult
cases, to the legislative intentions underpinning those laws. In
applying a norm which bans "vehicles" from the park, for exam-ple, judges are not required to make any choices about the sorts
of activities that ought to be banned from the park; they merely
decide what counts as a "vehicle," an issue largely governed by
linguistic conventions shared by judges, legislators, and citizens

whirlpool of unarbitrable moral conflict. Thus, there is a natural connection between
value skepticism in moral theory and legal positivism., See generally COLEMAN, supra note
22, at 9-10. Moral skepticism provides a reason for subscribing to legal positivism. As Philip Soper points out, this is a one-way street. Legal positivism does not provide a reason
for subscribing to moral skepticism. See SOPER, supra note 1.
The prescriptive positivist's impulse to purge abstract, moral principles from law,
and to replace them with concrete rules, is at its clearest in constitutional scholarship
where extreme positivists like Bork and Scalia struggle to reduce the Constitution's broad
principles to precise rules in order to avoid abstract moral theorizing. See ROBERT H.
BORK, supra; ROBERT H. BORK, TRADITION AND MORALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7-11
(1984); Scalia, supra notes I and 22.
26 HART, supra note 20, at 120-24.
27 Although positivism can account for general, morally weighted norms, such as the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, it requires such clauses to
be atypical as places where positive law incorporates principles of political morality. Prescriptive positivism's natural habitat is the highly technical, rule-like fields of private law
(tax, property, contract in its heyday), not the ideally impregnated fields of public law.
In such fields the positivist impulse is to tie ideal conceptions down by specifying them
into intricate formal doctrines. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 1, at 1178-79, 1182-84 (arguing
for adoption of originalist approach to constitutional adjudication on the ground that so
doing will yield the constitutional rules that the rule of law requires). For the significance, of the social fact of acceptance,

HART, supra note 13, at 97-107, 144-50.

see, inter alia, COLEMAN, supra note 22, at 3;
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alike.' On those rare occasions when neither statutory language
nor linguistic conventions settle the matter, the role of the judge.
is to ferret out the intentions of the legislature, obscure though
they may be.' Legal decision is thus purged of value choices.
The law, like the facts, is found, not made.
The implication of formalism by the thin conception of the
rule of law is, if anything, even stronger and more direct than the
implication of positivism. If law is a system of rules, and if the rule
of law is the principle of formal justice applied to that system,
then legal reasoning ought to be formal rule application: the
syllogistic subsumption of particular facts under pre-existing
rules.' As Hart himself stated: "[I]t might be said that to apply a
law justly to different cases is simply to take seriously the assertion
that what is to be applied in different cases is the same general
rule, without prejudice, interest or caprice." s Rule formalism in
legal decision is formal justice in action.
IV.

THE IDEALIST INTERPRETATION OF FIDELITY TO PRE-EXISTING

LAW
Positivism (and its version of formalism) can be (and are)
criticized from all directions. The distinctiveness of the idealist
critique of positivism reconstructed here lies in the claim that
positivism disappoints the ideal of decision in accordance with preexisting law, whereas idealism perfects that ideal. 2 The elements

28 See HART, supra note 20, at ch. 7.
29 Hart himself calls for creative choice at this point. A more prescriptive positivist
would insist on recourse to legislative intention and legislative history. See DWORKiN, supra
note 13, at 9, 14-15, 19-23.
30 Moreover, as the preceding discussion shows, prescriptive positivism itself implies
formalism. Once we posit a system of rules, we are naturally led to picture legal decision
as the formal application of those rules.
31 HART, supra note 20, at 156-57. Schauer also embraces formalism understood as a
practice where "a decisionmaker reaches the result indicated by some legal rule, independent of that decisionmaker's own best judgment and independent of the result that
might be reached by direct application of the justifications lying behind the rule."
Schauer, supra note 22, at 664. See generally SCHAUER, supra note 14. I agree with Schauer
that formalism in this sense should not be an epithet.
32 Although I shall reconstruct this argument out of Dworkin's writings, the writings
of Lon Fuller, Henry Hart and Albert Sacks prefigure the argument. See HART & SACKS,
supra note 14, at 138-41, 155-71, 386-400. Hart and Sacks' account of "reasoned elaboration" prefigures Dworkin's constructivist account of legal reasoning. Id. at 161-71. Both
accounts emphasize the attribution of moral justifications to positive legal rules; stress the
role of coherence with the primary legal materials as the test of permissible justifying
theories; criticize the positivist doctrine of discretion as a phenomenologically wrong ac-
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of this claim can be reconstructed out of Ronald Dworkin's writings.'3 By reconstructing Dworkin, we -can fashion the strongest
argument that decision in accordance with pre-existing standards
requires a holistic and coherentist form of legal justification.
A.

The Failure of Positivism and Formalism

The idealist critique of positivism' (and its version of formalism) can be cast (or, better, recast) as an attack on these theories
for failing to perfect the enterprise of decision in accordance with
pre-existing norms. Gaps and conflicts in legal rules prevent any
system of rules from fulfilling the dream of decision in accordance
with pre-existing norms. Paradoxically, the byproduct of the law's
quest for comprehensiveness and closure is the creation of gaps
and conflicts. Legal rules are framed with paradigmatic cases in
mind. The rule that running a red light is per se evidence of negligence is framed with the ordinary driver going about his or her
ordinary business in mind, not with the fire engine racing to put
out a fire in mind. However, the comprehensiveness of the legal
system prevents courts from holding that the unprovided-for case
is simply not covered, and from declining to rule on the controversy.' When facing the case of a fire engine that runs a red
light and injures a pedestrian, the court must determine whether

count of decision in hard cases, and as a failure to discharge judicial duty;, and argue
that the pursuit of the "right answer" does (and should) govern hard cases. Id. at 168.
Lon Fuller's emphasis on the role of reason as opposed to fiat in legal decision; his
emphasis on structure as the principal source of constraint on legal decision-making; and
his insistence that the fundamental issue in his debate with H.LA. Hart was "fidelity to
law," all implicate an idealist conception of the rule of law. See LON L FULLER, THE LAW
IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law--A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L REV. 630, 664-67 (1957-58); Lon L. Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case
Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1946). For an extended and valuable consideration of these
connectors, see Vincent A. Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition: The Legaty of
Hart & Sads, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 413 (1987).
33 This reconstruction of Dworkin's writings is not meant as a balanced or fair reading of his work. In particular, the reconstruction systematically underrates the degree to
which Dworkin argues for a fusion of positive law and genuine moral rights, a fusion
Dworkin regards as essential both to good law and to a good understanding of law. Furthermore, in Dworkin's current articulation of his theory, criteria of fit do not play the
decisive role attributed to them here. Dworkin thus extracts less from the idea of decision in accordance with pre-existing norms than does this paper. My aim here is to grind
a particular axe and my interpretations and criticisms of Dworkin are driven by the argument that I wish to develop. For an excellent, sympathetic exposition of Dworkin, see
STEPHEN GUEST, RONALD DWORKIN (1991).
34 The positivism that idealism attacks is an interpretation of the positivism of
H.LA. Hart.
35 See SCHAUER, supra note 14, at 224-26.
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the fire engine acted negligently. The court cannot refuse to rule
on the matter on the ground that it is not covered by the preexisting law.'s
Gaps and conflicts are inevitable in any system of rules"7 that
aims to achieve comprehensiveness. The inexhaustibility of the
world yields unprovided-for cases, and the commitment to comprehensiveness requires that those cases be resolved. When an unprovided-for case arises within a comprehensive system of rules, the
result can be described either as a conflict or as a gap. The unprovided-for case produces a gap in the sense that it falls between
the "core of certainty" of either relevant rule; it produces a conflict in the sense that either rule might be extended to cover the
case.s

36 &e Buckoke v. Greater London Council, 2 W.LR. 254 (1971); Lily v. West Virginia, 92 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1928); LaMarra v. Adam, 63 A.2d 497 (Pa. Super. CL 1949).
37 For present purposes, we need not choose among different conceptions of what
rules are. Beale defines "rule" as follows: "[a] rule means a statement of law applicable
only to a narrowly defined class of cases and incapable of extension by deduction or
analogy. Instances of rules are: the rule in Shelley's case; the rule that one must stop,
look, and listen before crossing a railroad track; the rule that one must turn to the right
to pass a vehicle coming in an opposite direction." 1 JOSEPH BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE
CONFLIcr OF LAws 21 (1935). Dworkin's similar conception stressing "all or nothing
force," see DWORIUN, supra note 21, at ch. 2, or Schauer's different notion of rules as entrenched generalization, see SCHAUER, supra note 14, at 47, differ in important ways.
All three definitions nonetheless yield gaps and conflicts in roughly the way described in the text. Se,
g., id. at 222-26 (analyzing problem of gaps and formal solutions to that problem). My account of the problem of gaps is very similar to Schauer's
approach.
38 The "core of certainty" reference is to HART, supra note 20. Schauer makes the
same point in terms of the extension of entrenched generalizations. See SCHAUER, supra
note 14, at 47-52.
Illustrations of "gaps" or "conflicts" among rules include the conflict between the
rule of strict liability for common carriers and negligence for warehousemen that was the
subject of Chief Justice Shaw's famous decision in Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Maine
R.R., 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 253 (1854), concerning the liability of railroads for goods that
they transport; or the question Shaw addressed in Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45
Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842), regarding whether tort rules of vicarious liability, or contract
rules disparaging implied contracts of indemnity among contractually related parties,
should govern the liability of masters to their servants for "industrial accidents." Many
cases of 'first impression" arise where either of two "rules" might control a class of cases,
but only one can.
A more modern example of a conflict appears in the controversy over the applicability of Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence-admissibility of subsequent remedial
measures-to product liability actions. Here, a specific rule (barring the admission of
such evidence in negligence actions) conflicts with a more general rule making all relevant evidence admissible. The question is, then, which rule should be "extended" to control the product liability case. Compare Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463 (7th
Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) (applying Rule 407) with Schelbauer v. Butler Manufacturing Co.,
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Because legal rules are permeated by gaps, conflicts, and
ambiguities, the law (in a positivist view) frequently runs out and
legal decisions frequently resemble legislative choices. 9 They do
so because gaps and conflicts prevent courts facing them from
being "doubly constrained" in the way that Soper describes.'
Courts confronting gaps and conflicts must still "reach decisions
that accord with pre-existing standards," but they do have a "choice
about the standards to be used in performing that task."4' They
can decide in accordance with either of the conflicting rules. In
42 for instance, Shaw might
Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Railroad,
have decided that accidents among servants of the same master
should be governed by either a tort rule or a contract rule.43
Gaps raise many difficult jurisprudential questions. For our
limited purposes, three observations are sufficient. First, complex
modern legal systems bring an enormous number of rules to bear
on many phenomena subject to their governance. It is not surpris4
ing that gaps and conflicts frequently arise within such systems.
Second, appellate cases-"hard cases" in one familiar sense of the

673 P.2d 743 (Cal. 1984) (refusing to apply identical state law provision).
Within our legal system, conflicts can be quite different from gaps. Common law
principles ("no man may profit from his own wrong"); open-ended statutory commands
(prohibiting 'unfair and deceptive acts or practices" in "trade or commerce"); and great
constitutional clauses (equal protection, due process) hover over innumerable rules often
overriding them even in cases where the application of the pertinent legal rule is clear.
But our legal system is not merely a system of rules.
39 "When a particular lawsuit cannot be brought under a clear rule of law, laid
down by some institution in advance, the judge has a 'discretion to decide the case either way.'" DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 81 (summarizing positivism).
Formal closure rules (for example, presumptions requiring the strict construction of
criminal statutes) appear to allow judges to avoid quasi-legislative choices and the creation of new rules. In fact, however, they only displace the problem. Closure rules avoid
some conflicts, but create others, because they force a choice over when to invoke the
authority of the pertinent primary rule and when to invoke the authority- of the relevant
closure rule. But see SCHAUER, supra note 14, at 224-25.

40 See
41 Id.
"no choice
42 45

SOPER, supra note 1.
Soper describes the second dimension of the "double constraint" on courts as
about the standards to be used in performing that task." Id.
Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842). See supra note 38.

43 Under the applicable tort rule, the master would be liable to one servant for the
torts of another. Under the contract rule, the master would not be liable.

The parallel freedom in both Flaminio and Schelbauer, see supra note 38, is the freedom to subsume product liability cases where the admissibility of post-accident product
design, manufacture, or warning changes is at issue, under either the general rule of
evidence law that all relevant evidence is admissible or the specific exception to that rule
barring the introduction of post-accident remedial measures to prove fault in negligence
cases.

44

It is both possible and common for conflicts to arise among more than two rules.
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term-are usually cases where more than one legal rule might
control the outcome of the case and at least two of the relevant
rules call for different resolutions.' Third, the theoretical difficulty presented by gaps and conflicts is largely independent of their
frequency (although the importance of the theoretical problem
depends on how frequently it arises).
Gaps and conflicts are triply embarrassing for a conscientious
judge. First, as long as we assume that a legal system is simply a
system of rules, gaps and conflicts frustrate the discharge of judicial duty. In such cases, the judge cannot fulfill her duty to determine what the legal rights of the parties are because there are no
pre-existing rights. Second, gaps and conflicts make decisions in
hard cases unfair to one party, who is retrospectively subjected to
a newly created legal duty. Decisions in these hard cases thus
violate a cardinal principle of legality-"no penalty without a law."
Third, on the positivist account, decisions in hard cases violate
both the commitment to legislative supremacy and the requirement of publicity (implicit in a democratic political culture)
stressed in democratic political philosophy46 and expressed in le-

45 See SCHAUER, supra note 14, at 188-91, 193 ("[T]he array of decisional opportunities confronting a judge will be a self-selected group of cases in which a plausible rulebased argument can be made on both sides of the issue."); Frederick F. Schauer, Judging
in a Corner of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L REV. 1717 (1988).
46 The view that publicity is an essential component of democratic legitimacy is
emphasized by John Rawls. See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 55, 130 n.5, 133, 177-82, 547 n.13,
570, 582; RAWLS, POLrrICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 6, at 66-71, 212-54; John Rawls, Kantian Conslrudeivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 534-49 (1980). This
view is not peculiar to Rawls. See JOSHUA COHEN & JOEL ROGERS, ON DEMOCRACY 150
(1983); JURGEN HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 184-88
(Thomas McCarthy trans., 1979); BERNARD A. WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOsopHy 101 (1985) (describing the ideal of transparency: "the working of [society's]
ethical institutions should not depend on members of the community misunderstanding
how they work."). Nor is this view new. Rawls finds it implicit in the contract tradition.
RAWLS, supra note 4, at 16. See also G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT paras. 142-56,
218-28 (T.M. Knox trans., 1942) (1821) (on the right of self-consciousness and the rule
of law). Marx intimates the condition when he writes of removing the 'veil . . . from the
countenance of the social life process." KARL MARX, CAPITAL A CRITIQUE OF POLrCA.
ECONOMY 173 (Ben Fowkes trans., 1977) (1867). Stephen Holmes suggests that publicity
may be the central principle of liberal constitutional democracy and connects it with the
liberal institutionalization of permanent political opposition. Stephen Holmes, The Permanent Structure of Antiliberal Thought, in LIBERAUSM AND THE MORAL LIFE 227, 241 (N.L
Rosenblum ed., 1989) ("A good case could be made ...
for the primacy of publicity in
liberal thought ....
If policies are set publicly and public criticism is encouraged, a
government can avoid self-contradictory legislation, discern problems before they get out
of hand, and correct its own mistakes. Liberals conceived the central institution of liberal
politics to be the opposition-not least of all because the. back-and-forth of public dis-
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gal idealism (especially in Dworkin's doctrine of political responsibility and his constructive model of legal justification).
The most evidently undemocratic feature of positivism is that
it makes decisions in hard cases resemble legislative choices. Judges must choose, on extra-legal grounds, the better legal rule." Although practically it may be necessary for judges to lapse into legislative policy choice when legal rules run out, doing so is a theoretically unjustified judicial usurpation of legislative authority.
Worse still, the judicial obligation to deliver legal decisions, not
legislative choices, obscures the reality of decision in hard cases.
Both the morality and the psychology of the judicial role make it
difficult for a judge to candidly concede that she is making legislative choices. For a judge to concede the point is to undercut the
authority of the very decisions she is making. On the formalist account of hard cases, the judge is faced with a Hobson's choice
among irreconcilable obligations. Should she deny the difference
between easy cases and hard ones and mask her legislative choices
in the language of legal decision, she conceals what she is really
doing and so violates the democratic demand that authority be
exercised openly and publicly. Should she acknowledge the difference, she is conceding that her decision is illegitimate-that she is
making a legislative choice, not rendering a legal decision. However she proceeds, she seems doomed to violate the democratic
demand that power be exercised in accordance with its public
justification.
These criticisms are not new. Realism prefigures them and
sophisticated positivists like H.L.A. Hart more or less acknowledge
them. But in the hands of realism and positivism they tend to
disempower adjudication. In the realists' hands these criticisms
tend to undermine legal decision by implying that formal (norm
to case) legal rationality is unworkable and ought to be replaced
by purely instrumental (means to ends) rationality. And purely forward-looking preferential policy choice cannot be squared with the

agreement was thought to sharpen the minds of all parties and produce decisions more
intelligent than any proposals presented at the outset.") (citing George H. Sabine, The
Historical Position of Liberalism, 10 AM. SCHOLAR 49 (1940-41), and JOHN MILTON,
AREOPAGMCA (John W. Hales ed., 1917) (1690)).
It is also worth noting that publicity is also a component of legal legitimacy in a
more direct way. "Justice," as a familiar legal maxim has it, "must not only be done, it
must also be seen to be done."
47 There are many different positivist descriptions of how this process does and/or
should proceed. See HART, supra note 13, at 120-32; NEIL MACCORMIcK, LEGAL REASONING
AND LEGAL THEORY ch. 8 (1978).
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ideal of decision in accordance with pre-existing norms. In the
positivists' hands these criticisms tend to lead to an awkward and
unsatisfactory staccato alteration of rule subsumption and open
policy choice.' The special positivist twist on the policy-choice aspect of legal decision is to confine and deflate it. Positivism is
committed to a deferential style of adjudication when legal rules
run out. Realism implicitly (and mistakenly) urges -free-wheeling
policy choice in the gaps; positivism recognizes that judges stand
on shaky ground when legal rules run out and counsels deference
to custom, popular opinion, or intimations of legislative intent.
Dworkin's writings, and legal idealism in general, show how
these objections might be turned against positivism and its version
of formalism, not against the legitimacy of legal decision. Far from
undermining legal decision, the failings of positivism prompt a
flowering of moral and political argument in law. By reconstructing the moral underpinnings of legal doctrine, legal idealism
promises to seal the gaps in formal law and so to perfect the
workings of legal decision. Paradoxically, rule of law values can be
used to justify blurring the line between legal and moral discourse
and fostering a style of adjudication whose boldness verges on
hubris.
B. ConstructingMoral Coherence:
The Idealist Conception of Legal Rationality
The general conception of legal reasoning that Dworkin articulates49 resembles Rawls' method of reflective equilibrium. Stated
briefly,'o it calls for the judge (Hercules) to generate decisions in
48 This is Duncan Kennedy's description. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 351, 385 (1973).
49 The idealist account of legal reasoning presupposes an ongoing practice whose
participants reason in certain ways and make certain judgments. Generally speaking, they
reason like lawyers and arrive at the kind of shared judgments that well-trained lawyers
reach. Idealism supposes that cases will arise within this practice about which the participants are highly uncertain. They do not know what the correct resolution of these cases
is and they may be uncertain of how to proceed in order to reason their way to a conclusion. Idealist jurisprudence is addressed to these participants confronting a practical
problem within their enterprise, a problem which leads them to engage in the self-reflection that we call legal philosophy. (These cases frequently involve "gaps" or "conflicts"--cases of "first impression," as the term is used in Farwell v. Boston & Worcester
RILR., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842)).
Legal theory, then, is legal practice reflecting on its dilemmas, and the theory of
legal decision presupposes both a practice of legal decision and a legal sensibility, just as
Kant's categorical imperative presupposes a practice of moral judgment and a moral sensibility. See Barbara Herman, The Pradice of MoralJudgmen, 82J. PHIL 414 (1985).
50 Many of Dworkin's more famous and controversial positions-for example, the
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hard cases by constructing an ideal theory of the institution in
question, a theory which is both descriptive of how that legal institution in question does work and prescriptive of how it should
work through a dialectical tacking between "political philosophy
and institutional detail."5 By "political philosophy," Dworkin
means a structure of principles which has moral or ideal force
and, as such, is capable of justifying extant legal rules. By "institutional detail," Dworkin means the settled doctrine and practices of
the system and the lower order reasons which purport to justify
them. 2 These lower order reasons are assigned "only an initial or prima facie place in [Hercules'] scheme of justification.'s
Provisionally, we might think of the "standing statutes and precedents," the settled doctrine of the system, as roughly analogous to
considered judgments in moral theorizing.' We might also regard lower order reasons as roughly analogous to common sense
moral precepts or principles"5 which are displaced and reordered
by constructive moral theorizing. Constructive moral theorizing

distinction between policy and principle and the various distinctions among types of
rights--are irrelevant for my purposes. I shall also assume that the relation between
Hercules' heroics and actual judges need not be spelled out here. Actual judges work
more instinctively than Hercules, displaying their theories of law rather than deploring
them, and undertake "partial justifications" of the law. See Andrew Altman, Legal Realism,
Critical Legal Studies, and Dmo,*in, 15 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 205, 213 (1986); GUEST, supm
note 33, at 46-47. For a detailed consideration of some of these matters, see James E.
Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L REV. (forthcoming Dec. 1993).
51 DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 107. Dworkin writes:
[Hercules] must develop a theory of the constitution, in the shape of a complex
set of principles and policies that justify that scheme of government . . . . He
must develop that theory by .referring alternately to political philosophy and
institutional detail. He must generate possible theories justifying different aspects
of the scheme and test the theories against the broader institution.
Id.
Hart and Sacks' account of "reasoned elaboration" prefigures this approach. See
HART & SACKs, supra note 14, at 160-68.
52 Dworkin's first criterion is captured by his description of theory construction as a
quest for the "set of principles that reconciles all standing statutes and precedents."
DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 119. The first criterion is discussed at length in DWORKIN,
Hard Cases, infra note 76, but the second only is briefly alluded to. Id. at 118.
53 Id.
54 See RAWLs, supra note 4, at 47-49.
55 Id. at 47, 100-01 (accounting for and explaining the subordinate place of common sense precepts of justice and on the principle of redress and its relation to the
difference principle). Cf RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 443-44 (1986) (writing on competitive principles of tort law that "people should not be held responsible for causing
injury they could not reasonably foresee and that people should not be put at disadvantage, in the level of protection the law gives them, in virtue of physical disabilities beyond their control.").
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drives moral reflection deep beneath the surface of everyday moral
reflection and yields principles which subordinate, partially replace,
and partially systematize the familiar precepts of ordinary moral
discourse.
Idealism requires that its principles be independently appealing on moral and political grounds and thus both justifiable and
justifying. This first requirement differentiates idealism from complex types of positivism, which can only accommodate principles
on the ground that they are extracted from settled rules and doctrine.' Idealism also requires that the principles its constructs be
able to fit, or account for, ongoing institutional practices. This
second requirement differentiates idealist legal argument from less
fettered forms of moral theorizing. Reflective equilibrium, for
example, places no limit on the extent to which considered judgments or prereflective principles may be revised. As long as our
considered judgments and justifying principles match, reflective
equilibrium exists.5" There is no requirement either that we hold
the same moral principles at the beginning and the end of our
inquiry or that our considered moral principles match the consid-

56 Such a positivism would be more complex than Hart's portrayal of law as a system of relatively discrete low level rules of the "no vehicles in the park" kind. This formalism would make room for the integrated and intricate rule-structures which characterize legal doctrines such as vicarious liability, offer and acceptance, contract damages, and
comprehensive statutes such as the UCC and (perhaps) the tax code. The contrast between ideal and formal principles emerges from a comparison of "a man may not profit
from his own wrong," DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 27, and the principle of corporate
taxation that "a shareholder-level tax on corporate income shall be imposed but generally
only upon its distribution to shareholders," Robert C. Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchaptkr C, An Essay in Statutorj Evolution and Reforrn, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 100 (1977). The work of
Langdell, Beale and the "legal scientists" appears to embody a more complex type of formalism. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 31-37
(1980). So, too, the positivist account of principles given by Neil MacCormick in his
adaptation of Hart's theory to accommodate Dworkin's criticisms emphasizes principles as
"summaries" of rules. MAcCORmicK, supra note 47, at 155 ("The principles of a legal
system are the conceptualized general norms whereby its functionaries rationalize the
rules which belong to the system in virtue of criteria internally observed.").
57 See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 48; T. M. Scanlon, The Aims and Authority of Moral
Theo y, 12 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-3, 8-10 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical
Reasoning, 106 HARV. L REv. 741, 751, 778, 783 (1993).
The text's description of the differences between ideal theory construction in law
and reflective equilibrium is not complete. Reflective equilibrium differs from the constructive conception of legal reasoning in other ways as well. For example, reflective equilibrium requires more than just a match of principles and considered judgments, but also
that our judgments at all levels of generality cohere. See John Rawls, The Independence of
Moral Theory, in 48 PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION 5, 8 (1975); Scanlon, supra, at 8-10; Sunstein, supra, at 753.
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ered judgments we held when we began moral reflection." Idealist legal justification, by contrast, limits the extent to which "considered judgments" (the settled law) may be revised. The theoretical structure of justifying principles that Hercules constructs must
"fit" most of the existing legal materials. 9 This limit on the revisionary power of reflection is what gives legal justification its ideological aspect. Legal reflection must, by and large, vindicate the
law as it is. 6' An analogous constraint on moral reflection would
require moral theory to vindicate our prereflective moral intuitions.
Taken together, these two requirements of fit and of justification cannot be fully satisfied. No morally defensible structure of
principles will justify all of the settled doctrines of any legal system, and any structure of principles which does account for all of
the settled doctrine will be a sham. Such a system would be morally incapable of justifying anything.' Consequently, "Hercules must
expand his theory to include the idea that a justification of institutional history may display some part of that history as mistaken."62
This theory has its own complexities. As Dworkin observes, mistakes come in two forms. The first type of mistake loses its "gravitational force," its capacity to flower from a discrete rule into a
general principle, but retains its "specific authority" as a rule effective in its own limited sphere.' The second type of mistake loses
both its gravitational force and its specific authority." Thus quali-

58 See RAWls, supra note 4, at 49.
59 The difference between legal and moral reflection should not be overstated. Total
moral criticism-moral reflection which overturns all of our prereflective intuitions-seems
inconceivable. Moral criticism which did not look to some of its audiences' fundamental
convictions would fail to move its audience. Our moral sense tends to play a fundamental role in any moral theory. But the comparative point-that moral reflection may revise
moral intuitions more drastically than legal reflection-appears sound to me.
60 An insistence on the ideological character of legal reasoning is one of the characteristic themes of critical legal theory. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 262-68 (1987); ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT

5-15, 118-19 (1986).
61 Dworkin writes:
[A]ny set of statutes and decisions can be explained historically, or psychologically, or sociologically, but consistency requires justification, not explanation, and
the justifications must be plausible and not sham. If the justification [Hercules]
construct[ed] makes distinctions that are arbitrary and deploys principles that are
unappealing, then it cannot count as a justification at all.
DWORIUN, supra note 21, at 119.
62 Id. at 121.
63 Id.
64 Id.
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fled, Dworkin's theory calls for Hercules to construct a structure
of principles which will justify most, and criticize some, of the relevant legal materials.es
1. Coherence and the Role of Criteria of Fit
Dworkin's criterion of fit is sketchy and phenomenologically
incomplete.' For present purposes, however, the details of an
adequate criterion of fit count less than the role played by that
criterion. Ideal theory construction can perfect legal decision in
accordance with pre-existing norms only if its criteria of fit are
discriminating enough to filter out a correct ideal theory for any
stock of legal materials. Criteria of fit are legal idealism's analogue
to positivism's rule of recognition-they separate the domain of
legal norms from the background norms of morality and politics.
I

65 I am indebted to Lewis D. Sargentich for this way of summarizing Dworkin's
theory.
66 I attempt to refine the criterion later in this Article. See infra Part V. Unfortunately, the idea of "fit" as Dworkin uses it is so abstract that it is more elusive than one
would like. Hercules' theories "fit" his entire legal system, and Dworkin's own exercises in
theory construction "fit" large chunks of our legal system in very abstract ways.
Two relatively simple examples may clarify the concept of "fit." The first is
Dworkin's own use of the story" of 'Tal's smile" taken from the annals of chess history.
See DwomIN, supra note 21, at 102-04. The Russian grandmaster Tal continually smiled at
the American grandmaster Bobby Fisher in the course of a chess match. Infuriated, Fisher claimed that Tal's conduct violated a rule prohibiting any player from "unreasonably"
annoying another. Fisher's claim requires, Dworkin argues, constructing the particular
conception of intelligence that chess seeks to test and applying it to Tal's smile. Constructing that conception requires oscillating between the rules of chess and general notions of intellect. Those rules "rule out" certain general conceptions of intelligence and
"rule in" others. A glance at the rules tells us that chess is about strategic intelligence
not contemplative intelligence. The task of a chess referee is to decide, by viewing the
rules of chess in light of the aims that animate them, whether Tal's smile is or is not a
legitimate exercise of the kind of strategic intelligence that chess is supposed to reward.
Put differently, whether or not Tal can exploit Fisher's temperamental hypersensitivity
depends on whether or not the cleverness displayed in Tal's strategy is the kind of strategic intelligence that chess is designed to test.
The case of Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Cal. 1975), discussed infm
note 126, supplies a clear illustration of the rhetoric of "fit." In L, the California Supreme Court replaces contributory negligence with comparative negligence because comparative negligence "fits" better with the master principle of negligence law-apportioning
accident costs on the basis of "fault." (The court's rhetoric, of course, may be wrong.)
Ultimately, the idea of "fit" must be seen as very complex, exemplified by the reasoning found in great common law cases such as Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428
F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dmenid, 400 U.S. 925 (1970), Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960), and MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y.
1916). Furthermore, Dworkin's own notion of "fit" must be tested at a very high level of
generality. See infra Part V.
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By doing so, criteria of fit ensure that decisions in hard cases rest
on distinctively legal grounds, not on moral or political grounds.
As long as criteria of fit have the power to filter out a correct
theory of decision, even in hard cases, the rule of pre-existing law
is realized and positivism is defeated. Should criteria of fit prove
insufficiently discriminating, legal decisions must rest on something more than the authority of pre-existing norms. If those
norms leave several choices open and a choice must be made, that
choice will have to be made on some ground other than the authority of the pre-existing norms.
These considerations bring us to one last component of the
idealist conception of legal reasoning-the "right answer" thesis.
We can begin to understand the significance of that thesis for rule
of law values by viewing it first as a claim about the role responsibility of the judge as a kind of judicial psychology7' resembling
the constructivist conception of moral justification. Though the
analogy is far from perfect, it illuminates certain distinct features
of the thesis and brings out its force. In his essay, A Theory of Justice,' Dworkin praises the constructive model for its appropriateness as a method of public, political justification.69 He traces that
suitability to the model's roots in a doctrine of political responsibility and its special emphasis on the requirement of articulate
consistency. 'This constructive model presupposes that articulate

67 This follows the spirit of Rawls' remark that "the procedure of reflective equilibrium does not assume that there is one correct moral conception. It is, if you wish, a
kind of psychology and does not presuppose the existence of objective moral truths."

Rawls, supra note 57, at 9. By "psychology," Rawls means the disposition, attitude, or process of judgment characteristic of a certain enterprise.
In their account of the "right answer" thesis, Hart and Sacks also gave the thesis a
"psychological" cast of this sort. See HART & SACKS, subra note 14, at 168 ("[T]here may
be thought to be a justification for describing the act of interpretation as one of discretion . .. . But this would be to obscure what seems to be the vital point-namely, the
effort, and the importance of the effort, of each individual deciding officer to reach
what he thinks is the right answer."). Hart and Sacks further distinguished the powers of
"discretion" and "reasoned elaboration" as "processes of judgment which ought not to be
confused." Id. at 160-62. See also KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY 210 (1992)

("Judges see their task as searching for a correct answer, and they do not commonly
perceive the law as 'running out' (or leaving room for legislative choice) in respect to
hard questions."). In LAW's EMPIRE, Dworkin connects the claim that those engaged in
legal argument suppose that they are searching for a right answer to interpretive activity
in general. See DWORKIN, supra note 55, at 76.
68
69

DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 159-60.
Id. at 163. "he natural model, we might say, looks at intuitions from the per-

sonal standpoint of the individual who holds them . .

.

.The constructive model looks at

these intuitions from a more public standpoint . . . ." Id.
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consistency, decisions in accordance with a program that can be
made public and followed until changed, is essential to any conception of justice."7

The relevance to this decision in accordance with pre-existing
norms is this: the right answer thesis follows from the doctrine of
political responsibility and the requirement of articulate consistency. In turn, these doctrines are implied by the idea of decision in
accordance with pre-existing norms and its companion conception.
of the judicial role. This ideal as well as this conception of the
judicial role are implicit in legal positivism but betrayed by rule
formalism.
As we have seen, decision according to pre-existing law requires legal decisions to be based on legal reasons. This ideal underpins positivism, but is disappointed by it because legal norms
and legal reasons frequently expire before legal decisions are
reached. Though formalism fails, the role responsibility of the
judge persists. The right answer thesis is the consequence of this
role responsibility, a claim about the demands placed on legal reasoning by the obligation of the judge. "It remains the judge's
duty, even in hard cases, to discover what the rights of the parties
are, not to invent new rights retrospectively."7 And so the right
answer thesis must not be understood as a claim about the properties of legal materials, a bizarre claim that those materials are
unambiguous and free from gaps or conflicts: "The proposition
that there is some 'right' answer . . . does not mean that the [le-

gal materials] are exhaustive and unambiguous; rather it is a complex statement about the responsibilities of its officials and participants."72 The right answer thesis should be understood as a claim

70 Id. at 160, 162. Cf. id. at 163 ("The constructive model requires coherence, then,
for independent reasons of political morality . . . ."). Dworkin also observes that the
constructive model "is not unfamiliar to lawyers," that it "is analogous to one model of
common law adjudication" which "accepts . . . precedents as specifications for a principle
that he must construct." Id. at 160-61. The pertinent model of common law adjudication
is the heroic tradition of common law adjudication, epitomized by the bold proclamation
that the common law is a seamless web. Moral constructivism rejects the naturalist interpretation of "moral truth . . . as fixed by a prior and independent order of objects and
relations, whether natural or divine" and replaces it with an account of moral truth as
the result of a procedure of construction answering to certain reasonable conditions. See
Rawls, supra note 46, at 519.
71 See DwomIN, supra note 21, at 81. Cf. HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 165-66.
72 See DwomuN, supra note 21, at 104. Cf HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 160-62,
165-68 (contrasting powers of discretion and powers of reasoned elaboration and arguing
that judges do and should try to resolve hard cases by pursuing the "right answer" to
them).
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about the institutional rights of the parties and the institutional
responsibilities of the judge: "The law may not be a seamless web;
but the plaintiff is entitled to ask Hercules to treat it as if it
were."73
Positivism fails to vindicate the institutional rights of the parties and frustrates the discharge of judicial duty. Its failures
compromise decision according to pre-existing law. They prompt
both judicial embarrassment and a deferential and shallow conception of law and adjudication. When rules expire, judges stand on
shaky ground and must act as deferentially as possible.
Legal idealism, by contrast, makes the ideal of decision in
accordance with pre-existing norms realizable and calls for a deep,
critical, and transformative conception of law. Hard cases do not
differ in kind from easy cases. In both, the judge presupposes a
right answer and vindicates pre-existing rights. The hard case differs from the easy one only in that it explicitly raises a limited
question of political theory and requires that the judge construct a
legal ideal which is not fully instituted in black letter law. Idealization does not stay on the law's surface of settled rules. Rather,
it goes deep into the law's underlying moral and political structure
to construct a theory partially critical of the law's surface-its instituted practices and settled rules. Though this links legal discourse
to moral and political discourse, it is not an usurpation of legislative authority but the purest realization of decision in accordance
with pre-existing law. Legal rules may fall silent, but the judge's
obligation to rule remains. Positivist deference does not discharge
that obligation; idealist assertiveness does.74 And so the ideal of

73 See DWoRKIN, supra note 21, at 116. Cf HART & SAcKs, supra note 14, at 165-66
(emphasizing that the 'underlying and pervasive principle of law that like cases should be
treated alike" requires judges to rationalize law into a coherent whole). This emphasis on
the judge's obligation to construct the underlying morality of legal institutions is what
differentiates legal idealism from natural law theories of adjudication. Natural law theories
insist on the existence of an independent moral reality which must be discovered, not
constructed, by judges. See Moore, supra note 12; Michael S. Moore, The Inierpreive Turn
in Modern Thery: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871 (1989). '
74 See DwomtiN, supra note 21, at 123-30. This view finds expression in hard cases
themselves. In Norway Plains, for example, Shaw observed:
It is one of the great merits and advantages of the common law, that, instead of
a series of detailed practical rules, established by positive provisions, and adapted
to the precise circumstances of particular cases, which would become obsolete
and fail, when the practice and course of business, to which they apply, should
cease or change, the common law consists of a few broad and comprehensive
principles, founded on reason, natural justice, and enlightened public policy,
modified and adapted to the circumstances of all the particular cases which fall
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the rule of law demands that a "formal style" of adjudication be
replaced by a "grand" (or ideal, or constructive) "style" of adjudication.' S
The realization of decision in accordance with pre-existing
norms, however, requires more than a demonstration that judicial
duty does not change when cases become hard. It also requires an
account of how that duty might be discharged. Though the right
answer thesis should not be understood as a claim about the properties of legal materials, it must be understood as a claim about
the discriminating power of the canons of ideal theory construction.
Dworkin's actual claims for the discriminating power of the
canons of ideal theory construction seem to have evolved over
time, though he denies any fundamental change. 6 The minimum

within it ....
The consequence of this state of the law is, that when a new
practice or new course of business arises, the rights and duties of parties are not
without a law to govern them ....
Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Maine R.IL, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 253, 267-68 (1854).
75 The difference between a "grand style" and a "formal style" of adjudication is
Karl Llewellyn's. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADrION 35-45, 62-75
(1960). I take Llewellyn's distinction to parallel (approximately) my distinction between
formal and ideal. Dworkin did not invent the high ideal style of legal argument he defends; he did, however, justify it and describe it better than any of his predecessors. For
Hart's recognition of the ideal style of adjudication advocated by Dworkin, see H.L.A.
HART, American Juripmdence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare of the Noble Dream, in EsSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 123, 135' (1983) (-To an English lawyer this suggested recipe for the elimination of judicial choice may seem to make too much of, or
to hope for too much from, a much admired style of adjudication followed by some
great English common law judges."). In England, the style may be anomalous; Llewellyn
argues that in America it is not.76 For the various versions of the "right answer" thesis, see RONALD DwORKIN, Is
There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?, in A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 119 (1985) [hereinafter DWORKIN, Hard Cases]; Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAW, MORALITY AND
SOCIETY 58, 84 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977) [hereinafter Dworkin, No Right Answer.]; DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 349; DWORXIN, supra note 55, at 266-75. As explained
in the text, Dworkin, in No Right Answer?, supra, appears to make a "right theory" claim.
In LAW'S EMPIRE, DWORKIN, supra note 55, Dworkin appears to have retreated to something closer to the claim that the postulate of a right answer is a presupposition of legal
discourse. See Gregory C. Keating, Justifying Hercules: Ronald Dworkin and the Rule of Law,
1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 525, 532-33 (reviewing RONALD DWORXiN, LAW'S EMPIRE
(1986)). Note that the role assigned to political philosophy varies in a critical way
throughout these pieces. In the true "right answer" thesis, political philosophy enters in
only to cement the theory (or answer) selected by criteria of fit. In the unheralded retreats from the "right answer" thesis, political philosophy comes to control the choice of
the correct theory. For Dworkin's present position, see Ronald Dworkin, Pragmatism,
Right Answers, and True Banality, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 359 (Michael Brint
& William Weaver eds., 1991) [hereinafter Dworkin, Pragmatism].
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claim required to permit rule by pre-existing norms seems clear
enough, however. Criteria of fit-fit with the existing rules and
doctrine of black-letter law (first order fit) and fit with the less
general reasons used to justify those rules and doctrines (second
order fit) 7 7 -together with the constraints imposed by the doctrine of mistakes, must be tolerant enough to yield a justifying
(ideal) theory but stringent enough to yield only one theory. Hard
Cases appears to make a claim along these lines. Criteria of fit are
said to yield a single correct theory, though that theory is insufficiently concrete to decide some cases. Hercules therefore has to
"elaborate the contested concepts that the successful theory employs"'8 simply as a matter of political philosophy. Political philos77 I first heard the terms "first order fit" and "second order fit" used by Lewis
Sargentich. A double criterion of fit is likewise at the center of Hart and Sacks' account
of "reasoned elaboration." See HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 165-66 (proposing a "double test" in hard cases: "[the judge] must elaborate the arrangement in a way which is
consistent with other established applications of it. And he must do so in the way which
best serves the principles and policies [which] it expresses. If the policy of the specific
arrangement is open to doubt, the official should interpret it in the way which best
harmonizes with more basic principles and policies of law."). Referring specifically to
harmonizing particular statutes or doctrines with "more general principles and policies,"
Hart and Sacks argue that "[t]he organizing and rationalizing power of this idea is inestimable." Id. at 167.
Hart and Sacks' first criterion is very similar to the notion of principled decisionmaking associated with Herbert Wechsler. See Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of
Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982 (1978). Dworkin's account of ideal theory construction appears to presuppose Hart and Sacks' first criterion and to refine their second
criterion. On the assumption of principledness in the sense of Hart and Sacks' first criterion, see DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 248-53. The notion of "fit" is strikingly invoked, but
not developed, by Karl Llewellyn. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 75, at 190-91, 222-23.
78 DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 107. Dwoi kin writes:
Hercules must then ask just what scheme of principles has been settled. He
must construct, that is, a constitutional theory; since he is Hercules we may suppose that he can develop a full political theory that justifies the constitution as
a whole. It must be a scheme that fits the particular rules of this constitution,
of course ....
But the theory that is superior under [the fit] test will nevertheless be insufficiently concrete to decide some cases. Suppose Hercules decides that the
establishment provision is justified by a right to religious liberty rather than any
goal of social order. It remains to ask what, more precisely, religious liberty
is . . . . The institutional structure of rules and practice may not be sufficiently
detailed to rule out either of these two conceptions of religious liberty, or to
make one a plainly superior justification of that structure. At some point in his
career Hercules must therefore consider the question not just as an issue of fit
between a theory and the rules of the institution, but as an issue of political
philosophy as well. He must decide which conception is a more satisfactory elaboration of the general idea of religious liberty.
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ophy thus enters in to concretize the one theory-the right theory-filtered out by the fit test. Political philosophy is necessary
only because the legal ideal that Hercules constructs may not and
need not be fully instituted either in the black letter law of the
legal system or in the social life that black letter law governs.
Viewed as a plausible specification of the implications of decision in accordance with pre-existing law for the practice of legal
reasoning, the "right answer" thesis has two parts. The first part
insists that a constructivist conception of justification is required by
the judge's obligation to decide cases in accordance with pre-existing public norms. The second part asserts that judicial obligation
can be realized because the criteria of fit employed by
constructivist justification are capable of yielding a single, correct
ideal theory.
The full closure of gaps and the complete sealing of conflicts
requires us to push the argument one step further. The uniquely
correct theory filtered out by the fit test must be rich and determinate enough to select one of the relevant, legal rules as the
correct one." One ruling should cohere better with the fabric of
the law as ideal argument reconstructs and purifies it than any
other plausible ruling.' Posner's argument in Flaminio v. Hondd' implicitly makes this kind of assertion. The ideal of efficiency
is presented both as fitting and justifying 2 product liability law

Id. at 10607.
For a similar interpretation of Dworkin's claim in Hard Cases, see HART, supra note
75, at 139. Dworkin's subsequent remark provides further confirmation: "When the discriminating power of [the fit] test is exhausted, [we] must elaborate the contested concepts that the successful theory employs." DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 107.
79 Compare the similar recommendation made by Hart and Sacks. HART & SACKS,
supra note 77.
Dworkin's own practice in discussing particular cases is to consider several possible
rudings and to select the best one in light of a highly abstract ideal theory. Dworkin
understands abstract theory to be rich and determinate enough to be dispositive even
when, as Dworkin now believes, criteria of fit are unable to select one correct theory. See
DWORKIN, supra note 55, at 238-50 (discussing the recognition of a right to damages for
emotional distress).
80 Such a theory would provide, in Mill's words, "considerations capable of determining the intellect" in favor of one rule. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARLANISM 4 (Hackett ed.,
1979) (1861).
81 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984).
82 Dworkin would, of course, reject Posner's theory as categorically wrong because it
rests on "policy" arguments instead of on arguments of principle. For Dworkin's objections to the use of "policy" rather than "principle" in judicial decisions, see DWORKIN,
supra note 21, at 90-100, and DWORKIN, supra note 55, at 221-24. For Dworkin's specific
criticisms of Posner's endorsement of wealth-maximization, see DWORKIN, sumpra note 13, at
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(indeed all law) better than any other ideal and as sufficiently rich
and determinate to provide decisive reasons in favor of extending
Federal Rule of Evidence 40 7 's ban on the admissibility of postaccident remedial measures to cases of product redesign and warning label revision.
Idealism is capable of perfecting the enterprise of decision in
accordance with pre-existing norms under two conditions. First,
criteria of fit must be capable of filtering out a single correct ideal
theory for any stock of legal doctrine. Second, the theory selected
must be sufficiently rich and determinate to provide a "balance of
reasons" favoring one ruling over its competitors. Whether or not
idealism can accomplish this Herculean task depends on the filtering power of the fit criterion in complex legal systems.
2.

Criteria of Fit and the Argument from Complexity

Thus far, the argument that criteria of fit can filter out a
single correct ideal theory for any hard case appears to be mere
assertion. Elsewhere in Dworkin's writings, however,s a bold and
intriguing argument in favor of the filtering power of the fit test
appears. In a legal system "thick with constitutional rules and
practices, and dense with precedents and statutes [t]he antecedent
probability of a tie [i.e., of no right answer] . . . might well be so
ground rule of the enterprise which inlow as to justify a ...

structs judges to eliminate ties from the range of answers they
might give. "s

237.
83 "&e, e.g., Dworkin, No Right Answer?, supra note 76.
supra note 21, at 279, 286. Compare Dworkin, No Right Answer?, supra
84 See DWORKINI,
note 76, at 84 ('[T]hough these occasions [i.e., ties] might be frequent in immature
legal systems, or in legal systems treating of only a limited range of the conduct of its
constituents, they will be so rare as to be exotic in modern, developed, and complex
legal systems. In these jurisdictions the intersections and interdependencies of different
legal doctrine will be so intense that . .. [f]or all practical purposes, there will always be
a right answer in the seamless web of [the] law.") with DWORKIN, Hard Cases, supra note
76, at 143 ('Two different theories may well provide equally good justifications,
along . . . [the fit] dimension, in immature legal systems with few settled rules, or in
legal systems treating only a limited range of the conduct of their constituents. But in a
modem, developed, and complex system, the antecedent likelihood of that kind of tie is
very small. The tie result is possible in any system, but it will be so rare as to be exotic
in these."). For a similar claim that cases where there is no right answer must be "ties,"
see ROLF E. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCr AND SOCIAL NoRMs 199.200 (1975). Sartorius is likewise inclined to embrace a ground rule instructing judges to ignore the possibility of such ties. Id. at 200-01.
The argument from complexity survives in a more muted form in Dworkin's recent
work as the claim that later authors participating in the writing of a chain novel are
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Framing the question this way is philosophically controversial
in its insistence that skepticism about the right answer thesis must
be internal (not external) skepticism.' And its assertion that an
internal denial of the right answer thesis must be a claim that
many cases are "ties"--that is, a claim that in many cases the
weight of considerations on both sides is in perfect equipoise-begs the question. Putting these objections aside for the
moment,' there are two plausible and potentially powerful arguments in favor of the thesis to consider.
The first argument concerns the relative weights of competing
legal principles."' Cases where there is no right answer are so
rare as to be all but irrelevant because the antecedent likelihood
that two competing principles will be exactly equal in weight in
any particular setting is exceedingly low. For example, the principle that "no man shall profit from his own wrong" seems more
clearly challenged by allowing a grandson to inherit his
grandfather's estate after killing him for the inheritance, than by

more constrained than those who preceded them because of the greater density of the
information that later authors face. Se DWORKIN, supra note 55, at 228-38. Though loosened, it still retains great importance in Dworkin's account of how constraint and objectivity are possible. See, eg., Ronald Dworkin, My Reply to Stanley Fish: Please Don't Talk
About Objectivity Any More, in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 287, 293 (W.J.T. Mitchell
ed., 1983). See also Dworkin, Pragmatism, supra note 76. The appeal of the argument from
complexity is not confined to Dworkin. Ken Kress more or less endorses the argument.
See Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283, 301 (1989). But the idea is, I
think, counterintuitive. Lawyers typically believe that complexity breeds less certainty, not
more certainty. For an argument underwriting this intuition, see Anthony DAmato, Legal
Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L REv. 1 (1983). Lawyers and law professors also tend to believe
that the move from rules to policies, purposes, and principles is a move from a relatively
determinate form of discourse to a highly indeterminate one. See, eg., Joseph Raz, Legal
PFndpes and tMe Limits of Law, 81 YALE LJ. 823, 841, 846 (1972) ("Principles, because
they prescribe highly unspecific acts, tend to be more vague and less certain than
rules ....
Though principles sometimes limit the scope of the courts' discretion, they
tend on the whole to expand it."); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 534
(1988) (stating that move from rules to purposes invites "a potentially infinite regress").
Schauer, however, appears to modify this argument. See SCHAUER, supra note 14, 75-76.
85 The right answer thesis is defended as a sound ground rule of the enterprise and
its denial disparaged as a claim typically not made "within the institution, [but] forced
upon the institution by external philosophical considerations." Dworkin, No Right Answer?,
supra note 76, at 83. See also Dworkin, Pragmatism, supra note 76, at 365-66; DWORKIN,
supra note 55, at 78-86, 267-74. For an argument that Dworkin cannot bypass external
skepticism in the manner that he proposes, see ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND
LEGAL THEORY 80-82 (1992).
86 See infia Part V.
87 Elsewhere in his writings Dworkin discusses the "weight" of principles in considerable detail. See DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 14, 46. Cf Raz, supra note 84, at 829-34, 836,
42, 846-48 (discussing principles and "weight").
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allowing a man who has traversed another's property unchallenged
for fifteen years to acquire a prescriptive easement by adverse
possession. So, too, principles of unconscionability have more
weight in the consumer context than in dealings among sophisticated businessmen.' Moral considerations are context-sensitive
and so are unlikely to have equal weight irrespective of the setting
to which they are applied.
The second argument invokes the complexity and density of
modern, mature legal systems. That density helps to make both
silence and perfect equality of fit highly improbable. Dense and
intricately developed legal systems cover every possible contingency, and their intricacy and detail rule out more and more possible
interpretations. Numerous interpretations can fit a handful of
fixed pieces of data whose structural relations are simple. Fewer
and fewer interpretations fit with each incremental addition of
data and each complication of structure.
This argument has some appeal. It seems likely that the less
one is writing on a tabula rasa, the more one is constrained by
what already has been written. Earl Warren is less free than John
Marshall. Offhand, it appears that it should be easier to make
competing principles of tort law such as negligence and strict
liability fit a handful of scattered decisions than a well-developed
body of tort law because the more the laws develops, the more it
is forced to confront cases where strict liability and negligence call
for different results. A simple mathematical analogy suggests
why.s' Consider the following three series of numbers: (3, 6 ...
), (3, 6, 9, 12, 15 ... ), and (3, 6, 12, 24, 48 ...

). The first

series is compatible with either of two rules: "to extend the series
add three to the preceding number in the series" and "to extend
the series double the preceding number in the series." Each of

88 See DWOIN, supra note 21, at 23.
89 I owe this analogy to Jack Cobetto. The fact that this kind of mathematical example can be used as the occasion for profound reflection on the problem of skepticism
need not concern us here. Within the enterprise of mathematics, the identification of
the correct rule in the cases described in the text is easy. The use of such examples to
explore general philosophical problems of meaning and/or skepticism is a different matter. See SAUL A. KRIPKE, WrrrGENSTEIN ON RULEs AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE (1982); COLIN

McGINN, WrrrGENSTEiN ON MEANING (1984); LUDWIG WrrTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 201-43 (1953); LUDWIG Wrr-rGENSTEIN, To FOLLOW A RULE (Steven H.
Holtzmann & Christopher M. Leich eds., 1981).
For a brief discussion of why philosophical skepticism should not concern us, see

supra text accompanying note 56.
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the latter two series extends the first series, but in a way which is
compatible with only one of the two rules that "fit" the first series.
These are the arguments that must succeed if the construction of ideal theories is to perfect decision in accordance with
general, pre-existing public norms. Criteria of fit must filter out a
correct ideal conception for any given stock of legal rules, or the
final choice of a governing ideal must rest on grounds other than
those supplied by the pre-existing law. Before we consider the
success of the arguments for the right answer thesis, however, it is
worth our while to summarize the links between the components
of ideal theory construction as Dworkin specifies them and the
enterprise of deciding cases in accordance with general, pre-existing public norms.
C. The Idea of Legality and Ideal Legal Justification
There is a widespread suspicion that ideal argument's invocation of the ideal of decision in accordance with pre-existing norms
is something of a fake, nothing more than rhetorical claim.O In
fact, the idea of decision in accordance with pre-existing law is
powerfully expressed by the four essential components of ideal
theory construction as we have reconstructed them. Those components are: (1) the doctrine of political responsibility; (2) the
coherentist and constructivist conception of legal justification; (3)
the rights thesis; and (4) the right answer thesis. We can link the
components of ideal theory construction to the precepts of the
rule of law in its thin and formal sense.9 Formal justice finds
expression in both the constructivist and coherentist facets of legal
justification. The link to the coherentist conception of justification
is plain enough: formal justice requires articulate consistency and
thus a demonstration that legal decisions fit together into a coherent whole. The link to constructivism is less obvious. Here the
connection lies in the irrelevance of the question of whether the
law really is a seamless web. The judge must treat it as one and so
construct, rather than discover, a set of justifying principles because formal justice demands that she weave the fabric of the
existing legal materials into a coherent whole.

90 Even Dworkin himself feels required to defend Hercules from charges of fraud.
See DwoRmi,
supra note 55, at 26062.
91 The "precepts of the rule of law" stem from the formal elements of the rule of
law referred to earlier. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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Precepts of publicity and prospectivity ("no penalty without a
law".) find oblique expression in the publicity condition built into
legal constructivism. Constructivism "demands that decisions taken
in the name of justice must never outstrip an official's ability to
account for these decisions in a theory of justice" 2 and so insists
on decision "inaccordance with a program that can be made
public."9 3 Publicity and prospectivity find more direct expression
in the rights thesis and the right answer thesis, which criticize
discretionary conceptions of legal decision in hard cases for creating rules, rights, duties, and liabilities retroactively, and on the
basis of private preference.
Finally, the doctrine of political responsibility, and the emphasis on the obligation of the judge which infuses the whole of
Dworkin's theory, are expressions of the idea that the judicial role
is to deliver decisions in accordance with pre-existing public
norms. The mutual support among these precepts and elements is
apparent upon a moment's reflection. For example, the publicity
condition supports the rights thesis (because the rights thesis applies pre-existing public standards), and the requirement of articulate consistency supports the public character of the constructive
model (because articulateconsistency is, by its nature, visible).
Reconstructed this way, an ideal form of legal reasoning embeds the ideal of decision in accordance with pre-existing law in
the practice of legal justification and the workings of adjudication.
Legal idealism meets certain conditions (articulate consistency,
generality, impartiality, prospectivity, and publicity) which are
themselves plausible specifications of the conditions that legal
reasoning must meet if it is to render decisions in accordance with
pre-existing norms. Idealism gains additional power from the fact
that the familiar, widely accepted precepts which find expression
in the idealist conception of legal rationality are shown to undercut some of the more prominent tendencies of realism and positivism. The extreme instrumentalism latent in realism, and the
purely preferential choice pictured in the positivist doctrine of
discretion, cannot be squared with the precepts associated with the
rule of law. However, the principled decision-making of legal ideal-

92 See DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 162; DWORKIN, supra note 55, at 165-66. In LAW'S
EMPIRE, the requirement of articulate consistency and the doctrine of political responsibility are to some extent subsumed beneath the more incluse concept of "integrity." See

generally id. at 225-75.
93 Id.
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ism can be. Idealism, therefore, trumps both positivism and realism.
Or so it would seem. The full success of the idealist version of
decision in accordance with pre-existing norms, however, hinges
on idealism's ability to settle hard cases without recourse to criteria other than those supplied by reconstructing the unique morality that fits and justifies the general, public, pre-existing laws of the
legal system. This is why criteria of fit are so essential. Criteria of
fit filter out legal ideals from the background of general moral
conceptions, thereby distinguishing legal from non-legal norms,
and thereby grounding decisions in hard cases on distinctively
legal reasoning. Should criteria of fit prove insufficiently discriminating, idealism would be forced to fall back on extra-legal considerations. The rule of pre-existing norms, then, would not be perfectly realized.
The filtering power of criteria of fit is thus the linchpin of
any coherentist and constructivist conception of legal justification
which invokes only the authority of pre-existing norms. The adequacy of its discriminating power is the issue that we must now
address.
V.

CRITERIA OF FIT AND THE CONFLICT OF IDEAL CONCEPTIONS

In defending his "right answer" thesis, Dworkin insists that the
only sort of skeptical challenge that counts is one whose skepticism is intemal-that is, one made from within the enterprise of
adjudication itself.' Skeptical arguments that seek to undermine
all claims of right answers to moral questions have no special bite
against theories of legal reasoning. So, too, skeptical arguments
that purport to show that all rules are subject to insurmountable
skeptical doubt are likewise unpersuasive.9 5 Despite their stric-

94 See supra note 84.
95 See Radin, supra note 22; Unger, supra notes 6, 60. Both Radin and Unger tie
their skepticism to the popular view that formalism requires an untenable theory of language. As applied to Hartian positivism, this argument appears to be diametrically wrong.
Hart's work is deeply influenced by Wittgenstein. See MARMOR, supra note 85, at 129-35.
Contemporary extensions and revisions of Hart's work that draw on the philosophical
conception of convention likewise involve a sophisticated theory of language. See,
g.,
Gerald J. Postema, oordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law, 11 J. LEGAL
STUD. 165 (1982). So, too, Frederick Schauer, who may be the leading current proponent
of legal reasoning as rule-application, develops an account of rule-application which purports to incorporate Wittgensteinian insights into language and rule-following. See
SCHAUER, supra note 14, § 4.3.
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tures, we persist in following and applying innumerable rules of
games, manners, and mathematics (to take only a few examples)
with relative ease. Furthermore, these arguments cut the wrong
way. General skepticism implies that legal reasoning is no more
determinate than, for example, addition or subtraction. No one,
however, ever presumed that legal reasoning was more determinate than addition or subtraction. Raising doubts about the certainty of application of mathematical rules may only make the
uncertainties surrounding the application of legal norms appear
less acute and less threatening.
Let us then accept the proposition that the right answer thesis
must be undermined from "within the institution [of adjudication,
not] by external philosophical considerations.'" The materials for
undermining the right answer thesis on its own terms lie at hand.
Rigorous application of criteria of fit leads not to the immanent
triumph of a single moral ideal but to the dialectical clash of
opposed ideals. Criteria of fit filter out an enormous number of
ideals available to unfettered moral reflection, but they do not
yield a uniquely correct ideal theory. Instead, they yield competing
ideals equally well-rooted in settled law (because each ideal fits
most of that law) but "in unarbitrable conflict with one another,
critical of different doctrines and transformative in different directions."m Pace Dworkin, the complexity of modern, mature legal
systems, makes them fertile ground indeed for competing legal
ideals. Complex legal systems provide a rich body of materials
which can be organized in fundamentally different ways. The prob-

Radin appears to invoke Wittgenstein in support of her view that formalism is incompatible with a sophisticated contemporary conception of language. Cf. GREENAWALT,
supra note 67, at 71-73 (objecting to general skepticism).
96 Dworkin, No Right Answer?, supra note 76, at 83.
97

Lewis D. Sargentich,

Theories About Law (Course Handout, Harvard Law School,

1984) (on file with author). Sargentich understands this claim to be a form of critical
legal studies. Roberto Unger makes a similar argument. See UNGER, supra note 60, at 57-

75.
In one sense, Sargentich and Unger certainly are right. The exposure of conflict
and contradiction in primary legal materials is one of the great achievements of critical
legal history. (The work of Horwitz, Duncan Kennedy, Frug, James Atieson's and Kathy
Van Wezel Stone's work on labor law, and Jack Beerman's work on 42 U.S.C. § 1983
come to mind as examples).
But in another sense the connection with critical legal studies is contingent. If I am
right, the inescapable logic at work is not critical but liberal, namely, the inner logic of
the liberal ideal of decision in accordance with pre-existing norms. Jeremiah Smith saw
the inescapability of conflict so precisely because he was straining so hard to achieve
coherence.
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lem is not that "ties" are common but that legal materials can be
organized into very different wholes.
To show that complexity breeds a plurality of competing,
equally well-fitting theories, we must test Dworkin's arguments
against some developed body of legal doctrine. Before we do so,
however, we must tackle two preliminary difficulties. First,
Dworkin's account of "fit" is too sketchy to do phenomenological
justice to the intricacies of any developed legal field. This difficulty
can be met, however, by refining the criterion of fit as we construct our test case.
The second difficulty is presented by the, abstractness of
Dworkin's account of legal decision. The concepts of "principle"
and principled doctrines, which play major roles in Dworkin's
argument, can be construed in very different ways. Principles come
in varying levels of generality. Some principles stay very close to
the materials that they purport to "fit and justify;" others hover far
above those materials. For example, the claim that reciprocity of
risk (or the lack thereof) fits and justifies accident law" invokes a
much more highly general principle than does the claim that
fault, understood as the failure to exercise due care, is the cornerstone of accident law.9
Dworkin's account of principled theory construction is open
to using principles of either level of generality. Unfortunately for
our purposes, principles of different levels of generality function
in different ways and are vulnerable and impervious to different
kinds of criticism. To test whether some criterion of fit can filter
out a single ideal conception for any complex body of legal doctrine, we must engage the enterprise of ideal theory construction'
at several different levels of abstraction."
Consequently, I propose to begin by testing the filtering power of the "fit" criterion
against an example of the relatively low level ideal theory construction. Thereafter, I shall explore whether the criterion of fit

98 This claim has been advanced by Charles Fried and George Fletcher. See CHARLES
FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES, 177-93 (1970); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in
Tort Theorjy, 85 HARv. L RE. 537 (1972).
99

Ames'

description and justification of the' late

19th century negligence re-

gime-"[t]he ethical standard of reasonable conduct has replaced the unmoral standard

of acting at one's peril"-appeals to the idea of fault as a kind of moral primitive. James
B. Ames, Law and Moras, 22 HARV. L REv. 97, 99 (1908).

100 I am grateful to James Fleming and Barbara Herman for emphasizing this and
persuading me that I need to address the enterprise of ideal theory construction at several levels of generality.
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filters more stringently once ideal theory construction is taken to a
higher level of generality.
A.

Low-Level Theory Construction

Let us then turn to our example-turn-of-the-century tort
law. 0 ' On its face, tort law is the natural home of cases involving
accidental harms. At the turn of the century, the dominant principle of tort law was fault (liability for harm caused through insufficient care). Strict liability (liability for harm caused by a risk characteristic of the actor's conduct" 2 ) was drained of generative
force and confined to discrete pockets of the law.
The operation of this confinement, however, cannot be adequately captured by using only Dworkin's categories of principled
and mistaken law. Some tort law doctrines were treated as mistaken in Dworkin's second sense.0 3 Although not overruled, some
doctrines were drained of gravitational force and their principles
were narrowly limited to the core cases that they covered. Direct
trespass exemplified this phenomenon. Nonfault liability doctrines
were also "repressed"' 4 in ways that cannot be captured by
Dworkin's categories. Tort doctrines, such as the doctrine of strict
liability for ultra-hazardous activities, were still governed by strict
liability principles but were not regarded as "mistaken." These
were exceptional doctrines.° 5 Exceptional doctrines are not governed by the dominant principle of a field but by "counter-principles."'"

101 To be precise, we shall be focusing on the law of non-intentional torts. To anticipate a discussion in the text, we begin with an exclusion. My discussion of this example
of low-level theory construction owes much to conversations with Lewis D. Sargentich,
Morton J. Horwitz, and James E. Fleming.
102 For a good discussion of exactly what strict liability is, see ROBERT E. KEETON,
VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE 159-64 (1969).
103 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. Confinement-mistakeness in Dworkin's*
second sense-played a critical role in the construction of the late 19th. century negligence regime. The distinction between trespass and case was, for example, drained of its
power by being construed not as a matter of substantive liability rules, but as a matter of
archaic procedural distinctions. This was done so well that much older law was effectively
overruled-treated as mistaken in Dworkin's first sense. See, e.g., Brown v. Kendall, 60
Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
104 I borrow this term and part of the following analysis from Roberto Unger. See
UNGER, supra note 60, at 58. My analysis also is deeply indebted to lectures by and conversations with Lewis Sargentich.
105 Both Unger and Sargentich employ this term. Id.
106 See id. at 59-60. Again, my understanding of this phenomenon is indebted to
Sargentich's lectures.

193]

FIDELITY TO PREEXISTING LAW

Fully generalized, counter-principles are antagonistic to dominant principles. Suitably constrained, however, counter-principles
complement dominant principles. Counter-principles, then, are
subordinated to dominant ones but are nonetheless allowed to
hold sway in certain subfields of the legal subject in question.
They are not "mistaken" in Dworkin's sense because they are perfectly appropriate for the particular subset of problems that they
govern. The key to their exceptional status lies in the fact that
they must be allowed to control only a subset of some field. They
are not wrong in principle, as mistaken doctrines are, but subordinate in principle.
Finally, and most importantly, nonfault liability was cabined by
excluding"'7 workmen's compensation from the general law of torts.

107 Unger uses the term. See id. at 58. Sargentich also has used this term and emphasized the phenomenon in his unpublished lectures at Harvard. Andrew Altman describes
exclusion well when he likens it to gerrymandering. See Andrew Altman, Lega! Realsm,
Cyitical Legal Studies, and Duwoin, 15 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 205, 216-22 (1986). Cf. MORTON
J. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 261-64 (1977) (describing the exclusion of the Mill Acts from the general law of eminent domain and insurance contracts
from the general law of contracts). About the latter, Horwitz writes:
In 1800 most lawyers regarded the marine insurance Contract as the most
prominent subcategory of Contract. By 1850, however, the law of insurance had
become entirely isolated from the main stream of contract law and was by then
considered a separate, technical body of law. The source of this crucial change
seems to be traceable to the fact that the economic and moral premises that
underlay insurance law were becoming increasingly subversive of the newer economically dominant contract of sale. Marine insurance doctrine had developed
during the eighteenth century in a homogeneous economic setting of reciprocal
business relationships among merchants of relatively equal bargaining power. The
clearly proseller contract doctrines developed early in the nineteenth century for
the law of sales, by contrast, seem to reflect the fact that this branch of law
reached maturity in a period when economic relations between economically
sophisticated "seller-insiders" and relatively unsophisticated "buyer-outsiders" were
becoming dominant.
The assumptions underlying these two radically different models of business
dealings first began to clash in a battle over adopting the rule of caveat emptor
early in the nineteenth century. Every time that a court adopted the caveat emptor rule for sales contracts, it was confronted with the argument of counsel that
the "true" common law coniract rule that had already emerged from insurance
law required the full disclosure of all material facts necessary to rationally judge
the level of risk in a bargain. As a result, during the first half of the nineteenth
century, judges first "distinguish" sales from insurance contracts, then later claim
that the "true" paradigm of contract is the sale of goods and not the insurance
contract, and finally they end all contradiction by treating the law of insurance
as a separate and autonomous area of the law whose "principles" have nothing
to do with the general law of contract. Contract law, in short, achieved [coherence] by "purifying" itself through the expulsion of legal doctrines that had
become alien to the norms of nonintervention underlying the market economy
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On the surface, industrial accidents are a part of the general
law of accidents. The "principled" basis for their apparently artificial and arbitrary expulsion from the law of torts lies in the fact
that the statutorily mandated workmen's compensation schemes
which applied to such accidents were undeniably organized around
an (exceptional) principle of nonfault liability and simply could
not be reconciled with the main body of tort law, which was organized around the dominant principle of fault liability.'tu Inclusion threatened the internal coherence of tort law. Exclusion
promised to preserve that coherence.
The turn of the century may well have represented the historic high tide of fault-based liability. The dominance of that principle hardly could be questioned. Yet even that dominance was not
sufficient to rule out the radical reconstruction of tort law. The
competing principle of nonfault liability was not dead but dormant. Precisely because criteria of fit and the materials that they
organize are complex, the triumph of any particular ideal conception is precarious. Principles are matched by counter-principles,
and the latter represent standing resources which can be deployed
to criticize and transform seemingly settled bodies of law.
In the case of turn-of-the-century tort law, the collision of
nonfault liability in the worker's compensation statutes with the
fault principle of accident law provided the materials for radically
reshaping the entire body of accident law. As Jeremiah Smith foresaw, the seemingly vanquished principle of nonfault liability was
on the verge of reawakening and reconstructing the law of torts:
There is a movement now going on in this country for the
enactment of legislation based upon the principle of the English Workmen's Compensation Act. This legislation is founded
largely upon a theory inconsistent with the fundamental principle of the modem common law of torts. As to a considerable
number of the accidents covered by some of the recent statutes, the results reached under the statute would be absolutely
irreconcilable with results reached at common law in cases

of the nineteenth century.
Id. at 264. Dworkin's notion of "departments of law" and "local priority" recognize the
influence of such classifications of cases and doctrines into legal fields and subfields, but
fhil to recognize the fluidity of these categories and the way that legal reasoning restructures them. See DwoRKIN, supra note 55, at 250-54.
108

For a helpful overview of this period of tort history, see G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT

LAW iN AMERicA: AN INTELLEcTUAL HISToRY 12-19, 3756, 60-62, 92-110 (1980). White
situates both doctrine and leading scholarship in useful ways.
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outside the scope of the statute. This incongruity must inevitably provoke discussion as to the intrinsic correctness of the
modem common law of torts; and is likely to lead, either to a
movement in favor of repealing the statutes, or to a movement
in favor of making radical changes in the common law."°
Contemporary commentators sought to deflect the subversive
force of the workmen's compensation statutes by excluding those
statutes from tort law proper." ° Because the statutes displaced
the common law and reversed its conclusions, these efforts were
disingenuous and doomed to fail:
[N]otwithstanding these modes of characterizing this kind of
legislation [as outside the law of torts proper], two stubborn
facts remain. First: the statute imposes upon an employer a
duty of compensation, which did not exist under the modem
common law of torts. Second: the theory underlying the statute, its basic principle, is in direct conflict with the fundamental doctrine of the modem common law of torts. The statute
shows "a distinct revulsion from the conception, that fault is
essential to liability." It is "a distinct reversion to the earlier
conceptions that he who causes harm, however innocently, is,
as its author, bound to make it good.""'
With remarkable foresight, Smith asserted that a fundamental
shift in the common law of torts, a reversal of principle and
counter-principle, was all but inevitable, and that a change of this
magnitude could be effected by reconstructing a handful of strategic doctrines:
By a very liberal construction of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine;
by a broad view of what constitutes primafacie evidence of negligence; and by inverting the burden of proof (putting on
defendant the burden of proving that he was not negligent) ,--the court could go far towards practically reversing the

109 Jeremiah Smith, Sequel to the Worimen's Compensation Ads, 27 HARV. L REV. 235
(1913) (footnote omitted). Worker's compensation statutes had the generative power that
they did partly because they were recent legislative innovations. They therefore expressed
the trend of history and spoke with the voice of popular authority. These contextual
determinants of a principle's generative power are critical but beyond the scope of this
Article.
110 Id. at 245. See also Jeremiah Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability--Suggsted Changes in
Cassification, 30 HARV. L. REV. 241, 319, 409 (1917) (proposing a reorganization of the
legal landscape so that only 'Fault based" forms of non-contractual liability would be included in tort. Tort was to be saved from being torn apart by internal conflict by purging nonfault doctrines from its domain).
111 Smith, supra note 109, at 245-46 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1

common law of A.D. 1900 in a large proportion of cases." 2
We can generalize Smith's insight. Settled legal rules always
straddle competing ideal conceptions and the canons of legal
rationality permit the radical reconstruction of large and seemingly
settled bodies of doctrine.
At least as far as theory construction at a low level of generality is concerned, then, the argument from complexity fails. The
complexity and density of developed legal systems do not constrain
theory construction in the way, or to the extent, that Dworkin
supposes, because the complex data that ideal theories must fit is
not fixed but fluid. Contending legal theories reshape the primary
legal materials that they purport merely to interpret, remaking
those materials in their own images. Competing theories quarrel
not over which theory best fits a neutrally defined set of cases and
doctrines, but rather over the cases and doctrines ideal theories
must fit, the internal structure of the law's various fields, and the
boundaries among those fields.""
By reshaping the materials that they purport merely to fit,
competing legal ideals escape from the straight jacket that the criterion of fit seeks to impose on them. The fit test thus rules out
numerous possible ideals, but it does not rule in only a single
ideal. This plurality of equally well-fitting ideals yields cases where
there is no "right answer" because it invites a conflict among legal
principles. Once the canons of ideal theory construction permit a
plurality of ideal conceptions to enter legal argument, ideal principles are less likely to have generally accepted weights. Indeed,
competing legal principles gather their weights not just from our

112 Id. at 367. For a glimpse of the unfolding of this process, see WHITE, supra note
108, at 108-10.
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Compare the discussion of contract damages in

CHARLES FRIED,

CONTRACr AS

PROMISE 17-27, 58-73 (1981) with Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest
in Contract Damages, 46 YALE LJ. 52, 373 (1936-37).
Fuller and Fried draw the boundaries between contract and tort, and render the
internal structure of contract law very differently. Fried classifies reliance-based recovery as
recovery in tort, not contract, and classifies doctrines such as mistake and frustration as
gap-plugging doctrines bearing only on contract performance. Reliance-based recovery is
thus excluded, and mistake and frustration are exceptional. Consequently, these doctrines,
and the principles they embody, have no generative power. Fuller, by contrast, includes
reliance-based recovery within the law of contract and integrates mistake and frustration
with the law of contract remedies, thereby making them generative of contract principles.
These competing classifications of the primary legal materials serve competing claims
about contract's dominant moral principle, buttressing in one case the argument that
autonomy is the life of contract as we know it, and, in the other, the argument that
reciprocity is contract's guiding moral ideal.
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judgments about their weight in particular contexts, 4but also from

the ideal conceptions in which they are embedded."
Different ideal conceptions can, and frequently do, assign
different weights to competing principles. Proponents of different
ideals may therefore disagree over cases not because they view
those cases as virtual "ties" and take positions on opposite sides of
a fine line, but because they assign priority to different principles
which endorse very different conclusions. From the vantage point
of two equally well-fitting theories, a case may be quite easy. Yet
each theory will find it "easy" to decide the case in different ways.
Some "hard cases," at any rate, are not cases where the balance of
competing considerations is all but even, but cases where equally
well-fitting ideal conceptions conclude that different considerations
are decisive. Those different considerations call for different results.
Conflicts between equally well-fitting ideal conceptions can be
powerful and pervasive: powerful because idealism takes various
moral conceptions to be the essence of law, and once invoked,
those conceptions can criticize and transform substantial chunks of
legal doctrine; pervasive because the competing conceptions that
fit our law can, and frequently do, disagree across entire legal
fields. For example, proponents of individual freedom and proponents of fairness (or, at least, proponents of certain conceptions of
each) disagree across the whole of product liability law." 5
Though the filtering effected by the fit criterion is genuine, it
leaves room for substantial and systemic disagreement.
B.

High-Level Theory Constrnction

The issue then becomes whether the criterion of fit can be
made more discriminating by pushing the enterprise to a higher

114 General agreement on the relative "weights" of competitive principles is assumed
by the variant of the right answer thesis that invokes the argument from complexity.
Dworkin tends to attribute that agreement to the fact that the power of principles depends on the context in which their application is considered. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
115 Compare Alan Schwartz, Propoalsafor PJdud Liability Reform A Theoretical Synthesis,
97 YAM LJ. 353 (1988) (arguing that the norm of individual autonomy requires returning to a quasi-contractual regime of warning liability for product accidents) ith KEETON,
supra note 102, at 108-12, 161-64 (1969) (suggesting that fairness requires the beneficiaries of profitable but risky activities to bear the accident costs that those activities engender, and so requires strict liability for product accidents). Note also Horwitz's observations
about the conflicting principles of 19th century sales and insurance contracts. Se
HoRwrrz, supra note 107.
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level of generality. This is an attractive strategy. Dworkin's own
work frequently invokes a highly abstract right to "equal concern
and respect"'16 as its master principle. The reconciliation of competing legal principles seems to be a task for which abstract ideal
argument is well-suited. And, finally, a move to a higher level of
abstraction connects legal reasoning to political philosophy in a
singularly intimate way. To be sure, H.L.A. Hart has persuasively
argued that Dworkin's principle of equal concern and respect is so
abstract as to be empty, 7 but the failings of Dworkin's favorite
principle do not discredit the entire strategy. Academic legal literature is rife with arguments that certain high level principles fit
and justify the various low-level principles expressed by legal doctrines."' The effect of these arguments is to make a certain division of labor among legal principles itself a matter of principle.
To assess whether the move to a higher level of generality can
render the fit test more constraining, we must examine an instance of such a theory which fits and justifies turn-of-the-century
tort law. One such theory, at least roughly speaking, is the reciprocity of risk theory. That theory, sketched twenty years ago by
George Fletcher and Charles Fried,"9 invokes the idea of the social contract to determine the terms of reasonable risk-imposition.
Boiled down, the theory holds that reciprocal risk-imposition"0 is
fair. When risks are reciprocally imposed, actors receive implicit inkind compensation for their exposure to risks in the form of a
right to impose equivalent risks on others. This is a valuable right
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DWORKIN, supra note 55, at 221-22, 297-99 (speaking of equality slightly more

generally); RONALD DWORKIN, Liberalism, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 181, 190 (1985); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part I"Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185 (1981);
Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 11. Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 283
(1981); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part III: The Place of Liberty, 73 IOWA L. REv. 1

(1987); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part IV Political Equality, 22 U.S.F. L. REv. 1
(1987); RONALD DWORKIN,

What Rights Do We Have?, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 266,

272-73 (1977).
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H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM 77, 86-97 (Alan

Ryan ed., 1979). But see RONALD DWORKIN, Do We Have a Right to Ponography?, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 335 (1985). Hart's criticisms precede Dworkin's four part series on
equality, supra note 116.
118 Richard Posner's early work is instructive here. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of
Negigence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). Posner uses efficiency to justify the general dominance of negligence over strict liability, but also uses efficiency to explain the correctness
of using strict liability in certain exceptional areas. For a good discussion of vicarious liability, see id. at 42-44.
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See supra note 98.

120 Risks are reciprocal when they are equal in the probability and magnitude of the
prospective harm that they threaten and imposed for equally good reason.
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because the imposition of risks of injury and death on others is
*the inevitable by-product of engaging in many of the activities essential to leading a normal human life."'
Reciprocity of risk thus provides a criterion for dividing the
labor of tort law between negligence liability and strict liability.12
Negligence is the appropriate liability rule for those activities
which are characterized by reciprocal risk-imposition. When, in the
course of nonnegligent conduct, the risks of such activities eventuate in harm, no compensation is required because the victim has
already received ex ante compensation in the form of her right to
impose equal risks on others by engaging in the very same activity.
Negligent conduct breaks this reciprocity of risk and so entities its
victim to compensation. Strict liability is appropriate when actors
impose nonreciprocal risks of injury on their prospective victims.
The "disparate pockets of strict liability" found in turn of the
century tort law are quite plausibly characterized as unusual areas
of nonreciprocal risk imposition. 23
This theory is a plausible, account of why tort law should be
divided between areas of strict liability and areas of negligence,
and it produces an account according to which both of these
lower-level principles are, so to speak, principled. The dominant
principle of tort law is the principle of reciprocity. (That principle
itself is an expression of a conception of fairness rooted in social
contract theory). Negligence and strict liability faithfully express
the implications of the reciprocity principle under circumstances
of reciprocal risk imposition and nonreciprocal risk imposition,
respectively. In this sense, the move to a higher level of theory
construction escapes the criticisms to which the lower level of
theory construction, examined earlier, succumbed.

121 To take a truly mundane example, we would be unable to drive to work if we
could not impose risks of injury and death on others. Reciprocal risk theory holds that
we may do so without compensating those we injure because they receive an equal right
to impose risks on us. That is, until we drive carelessly. Careless driving breaks the equilibrium of risk that reciprocity establishes and entitles the victim of careless conduct to
compensation.
122 This is more Fletcher's contribution than Fried's. See Fletcher, supra note 98, at
541-48.
123 Id. To justify the predominance of negligence, reciprocal risk theory also needs
the idea of the "risk pool" introduced by Fried. The "risk pool" holds that certain nonreciprocal risks--such as those imposed on pedestrians by drivers-become, over time,
reciprocal because everyone takes turns at driving and walking. See FRIED, supra note 98,
at 187-89.
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Indeed, if the move to a higher level of abstraction were to
succeed in increasing the filtering power of the fit criterion so
that it selected a single abstract philosophical ideal for any complex field of law, legal idealism would have succeeded in an astonishing way. The fullest sort of fidelity to pre-existing law would be
married to the greatest kind of critical power in the service of
moral ideals. Ideal theory might be used not just to seal the gaps
and settle the conflicts that plague formal law, but also to criticize
and revise legal rules whenever they fail to do justice to the law's
deep moral ideals.
Two properties of highly abstract principles produce extraordinary critical and revisionary power with respect to black-letter legal
rules: their abstractness and their invocation of powerful moral
and political ideals. Because abstract principles are abstract, they
can be specified in many different ways. Seemingly settled bodies
of law can be radically reshaped by abstracting and then recasting
their deepest principles. Precisely because they embody powerful
moral and political ideals (fairness, equality, or utility, for instance), the favored principles of abstract idealism easily can criticize and revise large chunks of legal doctrine.
These properties of abstract ideal argument are on full display
in some of the great transformative common law cases. Consider
Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,124 which overturned the requirement of privity of contract as a condition for
suit against manufacturers of defective products. Cardozo justified
that rule revision on the ground that the privity requirement no
longer institutionalized the deep principles of foreseeability of
harm and respect for the freedom and security of other persons 2 1 that are the cornerstones of negligence law. These
principles criticize the privity of contract requirement instead of
justifying it because the rise of twentieth century technology has

124 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
125 See id. at 1053.54. Cardozo puts the connection between foreseeability and respect
for the integrity and security of other persons even more forcefully in Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928):
The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk
imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension . . . . Negligence, like risk, is thus a term of relation. Negligence in the
abstract, apart from things related, is surely not a tort, if indeed it is understandable at all ....
Affront to personality is still the Ieynote
of the urong.
Id. at 100-01 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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increased the destructive power of machines, and the rise of mass
production and distribution have extended the sphere of those
endangered by poorly manufactured products and altered the
economic relationships among them. Social change has turned the
immutable core principles of tort law26 into levers of criticism
and revision:
Precedents drawn from the days of travel by stage-coach do not
fit the conditions of travel today. The principle that the danger
must be imminent does not change, but the things subject to
the principle do change. They are whatever the needs of life in
a developing civilization requires them to be ....
If [the manufacturer] is negligent, where danger is to be foreseen, a liability will follow. There injury to persons other than the lessee is
to be foreseen, and foresight of the consequences involves the
creation of duty. 2
If criteria of fit alone can select a single moral ideal as the
ideal of any legal field, then the most heroic and bold exercises in
judicial innovation can be legitimated solely by the ideal of decision in accordance with pre-existing law. At its core, law is a web
of moral principle, not a system of positive rules. Rule revision is
justified whenever fresh moral insight into those principles, or
social change in the world they govern, makes a new set of rules
more faithful to those principles.'
The success of highly general ideal argument in perfecting
decision in accordance with pre-existing norms depends on the
126 Recall Shaw's claim in Noriay Plains that "the common law consists of a few broad
and comprehensive prindples, founded on reason, natural justice and enlightened public
policy ...
." See supra note 38 (emphasis added).
127 MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053-54 (I have rearranged the order of the sentences).
MacPherson is hardly unique. Similar forms of justification can be found in Javins v. First
Nat'I Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, 161 A.2d 69, 86 (NJ. 1980); Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Maine R.R., 67
Mass. (I Gray) 253 (1854); and Farwell v. Boston & Worcester RLRL, 45 Mass. (4 Met.)
49 (1842).
128 Li v. Yellow Cab, 13 Cal. 3d 804 (1975), is an example of a case which revises
rules on the basis of a new and ostensibly better understanding of the "principle" informing them. Contributory negligence must yield to comparative negligence because "the
doctrine (of contributory negligence] is inequitable in its operation because it fails to distribute responsibility in proportion to fault." Id. at 810 (footnote omitted). I am indebted
to Scott Bice for emphasizing to me how Li depends on rejecting an older understanding of fault, one vesting on starker notions of blameworthiness and moral virtue and
adopting a less judgmental modem conception.
The decisions cited supra note 127 all combine the appeal to (pre-existing) deep
common law principles and point to fundamental social change to justify extensive revisions of legal rules.
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discriminating power of fit at this level of abstraction. The flight
to a high level of abstraction in fact coarsens the fit criterion. The
additional test it now imposes is whether or not the ideal invoked
can account for the division of labor among less general legal
principles, such as fault and strict liability. (These lower-level principles would then be used to "fit and justify" the details of doctrine in the manner described in the preceding section).
Clearly, more than one abstract ideal can explain the division
of labor between negligence and strict liability. For example, no
less a torts theorist than Oliver Wendell Holmes thought that
social utility justified the pride of place held by the fault principle.' In a move which parallels the move made by the reciprocity of risk theory, Holmes also explained why utility called for
strict liability under certain special conditions. Holmes writes:
Gases [imposing strict liability] do not stand on the notion that
it is wrong to keep cattle, or to have a reservoir of water ....
It may even be very much for the public good that the dangerous accumulation should be made . .. [but] it may be considered that the safest way to secure care is to throw the risk
upon0 the person who decides what precautions shall be taken.13

To be sure, this passage is bursting with ambiguity. Quite
different modem economic justifications for strict liability can be
extracted from it. Perhaps Holmes thinks strict liability justified
because only unilateral precautions are available in such cases; or
perhaps he thinks it justified because it is important to regulate
the incidence of the pertinent activities as well as the care with
which they are undertaken; or perhaps he believes that, in this
restricted class of cases, the decision about precautions should be
placed in the hands of the party best able to make that decision.'-' For our purposes, however, the point is clear and simple:
utility can serve as well as fairness as a principle governing the
choice between negligence and strict liability. Moreover, the conflict between utility and fairness may be the most intractable of all.

129 Se OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, LEcTuRE 77 (Little Brown ed.,
1963) (1881).
130 Id. at 93.
131 For a discussion of unilateral precautions, levels of activity, and strict liability, see
STEvEN SHAVELL, ECoMOMIC ANALsIS OF ACcIDENT LAw 5-32 (1987). For a discussion of
placing the decision over precautions in the hands of the party best able to make that
decision, see Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Stric LiabiliUy in Torts,
81 YALE LJ. 1055 (1972).
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It is quite possible that we are now in the domain of insoluble
conflict between competing normative criteria."5 2
Once again, though, we should leave moral philosophy to
moral philosophers and train our gaze. on legal philosophy. The
point is this: no criterion of fit with the primary legal materials
can rule out either utility or fairness as a dominant ideal for tort
law. Either principle can be made to explain the critical division
of labor between strict liability and negligence that such principles
must explain. Either principle fits turn-of-the-century accident law.
In short, the move to a higher level of generality creates conflict,
not consensus. The character of this conflict is more obviously
moral but it may, for that very reason, also be more deeply embedded and more intractable. Insofar as they push and pull in
different directions, each principle will be critical and
transformative in different ways.
VI.

LEGAL DECISION AT AN IMPASSE

Neither of the conceptions of legal discourse analyzed in this
Article, positivism and idealism, is capable of yielding decisions
determined by pre-existing law. Construed to require as much
from legal reasoning, the ideal of decision in accordance with preexisting law is unrealizable. Sensibly construed to require only the
possible, however, the ideal is realized by either of the conceptions of law and legal reasoning examined here. Indeed, sensibly
construed, the ideal of fidelity to pre-existing norms leaves considerable latitude for a variety of conceptions of legal decision. The
high philosophizing of Dworkin's Hercules, and the most slavish
rule-following of a pure and rigid positivism, are polar extremes
between which other conceptions of legal rationality are suspended.
The account of legal reasoning proposed by Edward H. Levi,' 33 for example, endorses a practice of modest analogizing. As

Levi fittingly describes it, the effort to adhere to prior decisions
requires the construction of low-level generalizations specifying the
bearing of prior cases on the case at hand. Courts thus construct
the rules that they follow. This, plainly, is an enterprise that grants
them a certain leeway. They are bound by their own generaliza-
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For an argument to this effect, see THOMAS NAGEL, The Fragmentation of Value, in
QUESTIONS 128 (1979).
See LEVI, supra note 17, at 1-4. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 57.
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tions, not by the generalizations of the courts that they ostensibly
follow. It also imposes a certain constraint. More than one generalization usually will fit the pertinent precedents, but not just any
generalization will do. So, too, it generates a certain critical power:
new values come in gradually, and, for the most part, evolve
incrementally. Over time, however, these values4 can receive increasingly general articulation and broad scope.1
As a practice, this is neither the most expansive nor the most
constraining conception of decision in accordance with pre-existing norms. Its emphasis on following precedents and fashioning
relatively concrete rules places it on the rule-like end of the continuum of practices that represent plausible renderings of decision
in accordance with pre-existing norms. As a "rule-like" interpretation of the idea, however, it is less restrictive than some that can
be imagined. 5'
Conversely, there are accounts of legal rationality which stress
its ideal character, but conceive of judging in a markedly less
heroic way than Dworkin does. For instance, by stressing the idea
of ideals "implicit" in black-letter legal rules, Lon Fuller tempers
the generalizing, philosophizing, and criticizing dimensions of
ideal argument."
Implicit ideals are not reconstructed out of
legal doctrine by a flight to moral and political philosophy. They
are fashioned by attending to "the practices and attitudes of the
society in question."'"7 Fuller's variant of idealism is therefore
less critical and transformative than Dworkin's.lTM
All of these1 39 conceptions of legal discourse institutionalize

134 See LEVi, supra note 17, at 8-27 (discussing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111
N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916)).
135 More constraining practices would have to restrict judicial discretion in constructing the general significance of prior rulings. Prior courts might then bind their successors. See SCHAUER, supra note 14, at 181-87. For a clear statement of how a practice of
analogical reasoning might employ and satisfy a distinctive set of criteria of coherence,
see Sunstein, supra note 57, at 775-78.
136 LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 57-69 (1968).
137 Id. at 58.
138 Cf Charles Fried, The Arqtlcial Reason of the Law or. What Lauyers Know, 60 TEX.
L. REv. 35 (1981) (expressing doubts about appealing to abstract moral philosophy in law
and calling for a practice that makes more use of analogical reasoning and less general
moral norms).
139 Not all conceptions of legal reasoning satisfy the constraints of the ideal, by any
means. Some conceptions (mostly variants of legal realism or critical legal studies) are
denials of the possibility or desirability of deciding cases in accordance with pre-existing
norms. The hallmarks of these conceptions are either (or both) of the following claims:
(1) that legal norms are fully indeterminate; and (2) that legal decisions can be legitimated only by the moral or political goodness of their outcomes.
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the ideal of decision in accordance with pre-existing law, albeit in
different ways. Undoubtedly, each conception has its virtues and
vices, and each conception can be criticized and defended for expressing the ideal in the way that it does. But it seems fruitless to
suppose (or insist), as Justice Scalia does, 4 1 that any one of
these conceptions can be shown to be decisively superior on the
ground that it realizes the ideal of decision in accordance with
pre-existing law better than any other.
Consider, for example, the highly abstract form of ideal argument recoristructed in Part V.2. Its invocation of highly general,
morally saturated ideals like fairness and utility endows it with
uncommon critical power. The concrete implications of abstract
principles are protean and essentially contestable. No single specification of individual freedom, or equality, or fairness, can ever
capture or exhaust their meaning. Precisely because abstract principles can be specified in so many different ways, their revisionary
power is enormous. Seemingly settled bodies of law can be radically reshaped by abstracting, and then recasting, their deepest principles.
If this Article is correct, it is wrong (though illuminating) to
advocate this conception of legal justification on the ground that
it perfects the idea of decision in accordance with pre-existing
norms. This conception can meet the reasonable requirements of
that ideal, but so too can other conceptions. The case for preferring this conception must be made on other grounds: perhaps
because it holds out the most promise of reconciling law with morality; or because it enacts the best conception of human equality;
or because it vindicates individual rights.

Mark Tushnet has expressed both ideas in their purest form. He has written that
'the legal realists taught us that there never was a 'fellow servant rule'" and that there
are no specific rules or doctrines. Mark V. Tushnet, Marxism as Metaphor, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 281, 283 (1983) (reviewing HUGH COLLINS, MARXISM AND LAw (1982)). He also has
suggested that the right way for a judge to decide a case "is to make an explicitly political judgment: which result is, in the circumstances now existing, likely to advance the
cause of socialism." Mark V. Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Conslitutionalisn; 42 OHIO
ST. L.J. 411, 424 (1982). Cf. Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down, 96 HARV. L.
REv. 781 (1983).
The first of these ideas (radical indeterminacy) renders decision in accordance with
pre-existing law impossible. The second (extreme instrumentalism) renders this kind of
decision undesirable. The evaluation of these theories is beyond the scope of this Article.
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Scalia, supra notes 1 and 22. Cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674,

794 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 861, 870 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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THE LEGITIMACY OF LEGAL DECISION

At the outset of this Article, I observed that legal decision
could bypass difficult questions of legitimacy if legal theory could
show how legal decision might be nothing more than the application of pre-existing norms to present cases. In fact, that notion
fails to favor one conception of law and legal rationality over other conceptions, much less to determine outcomes in concrete
cases. This places the legitimacy of legal decision in doubt and
prevents theories of legal decision from avoiding the difficult issues of political legitimacy that lie at the heart of liberal theory.
Courts are political institutions exercising the coercive power of
the state. This authority must either be legitimated or be suspected. The inescapable task facing the theory of legal decision is to
show how the authority of courts might be legitimate.
Theoretically, at any rate, this task is fairly urgent. If the requirement that cases be decided in accordance with pre-existing
norms constrains and legitimates the practice of legal reasoning as
incompletely as this Article argues, then the critical work of constraint and legitimation must be done by other ideals. Practically,
the task is not trivial. Our conclusion leaves the question of how
best to discharge judicial duty wide open. It is not only unclear
whether judges should seek to render the legal materials into a
model of rules or a "forum of principle;"' it is also unclear
whether they should struggle after coherence as arduously as legal
theory tends to suggestL.
However deeply embedded in judicial psychology, the pursuit
of a "right answer" may be not only vain but deeply mistaken. The
pursuit of coherence ends by showing the law to be torn between
competing moralities. So, too, the contrasts between reflective
equilibrium and legal justification show the law to be torn between its achievements and its aspirations, between fit and justice.
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See RONALD DWORKIN, The Forum of PAindples, in A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 33

(1985).
142 The pull of coherence is evident in Cass Sunstein's "suggestion" that "correct answers in law might consist precisely of ...
our considered judgments about particular
cases . . . once they have been made to cohere." Sunstein, supra note 57, at 775 (I have
rearranged the order of the clauses). That pull is also evident in Ernest Weinrib's variant
of formalism. Sea John Stick, Formaism as the Method of Maximally Cohernt Clasnfication. 77
IOWA L. REv. 773, 782-88 (1992); Ernest J. Weinrib, Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason, 87
COLUM. L REv. 472 (1987); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism- On the Immanent Rationaity
of Law, 97 YALE LJ. 949 (1988).
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The pursuit of coherence implicitly denies these conflicts, and
implicitly ignores the fact that fit alone cannot legitimate our legal
decisions. Perhaps legal justification should flush out and acknowledge conflict, and explicitly balance fit against other political values. Only an account of other grounds of decisional legitimacy
can supply guidance here.
In thinking about the legitimacy of legal decision, we must
bear two fixed points in mind. First, we should not (and probably
cannot) simply discard the requirement of fidelity to pre-existing
norms. That requirement sits at the core of our understanding of
law, and its achievement is a necessary, minimum condition of a
just legal order. The arbitrary willfulness of despotism and the
strategic arbitrariness of totalitarianism are both incompatible with
faithful adherence to pre-existing law." Formal equality before
the law is achieved by the faithful application of pre-existing
norms and such equality is part, though only part, of a decent
legal order.'" Decision in accordance with pre-existing norms is
likewise a part, but only a part, of legitimate legal decision and a
just legal order.
Second, we must bear in mind that democratic sovereignty
resides in the hands of free and equal citizens bound only by
their free, rational and public consent.'
The great challenge
facing the theory of legal decision is to show how the exercise of
political authority in accordance with, but not determined by, preexisting norms can be reconciled with that sovereignty.

143 The contrast between faithful application of pre-existing norms and despotism is
taken from Rawls. The contrast with totalitarianism is drawn from Bruno Bettleheim. See
BRUNO BETTLEHEIM, THE INFORMED HEART 141-42 (1961) (discussing the role of deliberate arbitrariness in the exercise of authority in concentration camps).
144 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
145 See RAWLS, supm note 4; RAWLS, supra note 8.

